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THE PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE: DRAWING THE
LINE BETWEEN PERMISSIBLE AND
IMPERMISSIBLE TAX-SAVINGS CLAUSES
JAY

A. SOLED & MITCHELL GANS*

Over a half-century ago, the Fourth Circuitin Commissioner v. Procter
fashioned out of whole cloth what has become known as the public policy
doctrine. This doctrine declares void certain tax-savings clauses-those
clauses that taxpayers strategically use to negate the risk of additional
taxes, interest, and penalties-thatsimultaneously undermine the ability of
the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") to enforce the tax laws and thwart the
judiciary'sability to renderjustice.
As taxpayers have tested the boundaries of the public policy doctrine
via their continued use of select tax-savings clauses, the public policy
doctrine has evolved. In this analysis, we first explore taxpayers' use of
such tax-savings clauses. Next, we review the courts' responses to
taxpayers' actions and critique these responses. Finally, we lay the
groundworkfor the institution of important reform measures in this area of
the law.
We acknowledge that, in some instances, taxpayers have legitimate
reasons to use tax-savings clauses. In many instances, however, reliance
upon such clauses poses either a serious public policy threat whereby the
very administration of the tax system is at stake or a less serious, but
nevertheless important, policy concern whereby taxpayers can readily
circumvent their bona fide tax obligations. A line therefore needs to be
drawn between permissible and impermissibletax-savings clauses; this line
must strike the appropriate balance between the taxpayers' quest for
certainty and the IRS's mission to secure tax compliance.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Taxpayers usually accept those tax consequences that they anticipate
and abhor those tax consequences that they consider unanticipated. To
shield against the latter, many taxpayers insert so-called "tax-savings
clauses" into their operative legal documents. While tax-savings clauses
come in a variety of forms (e.g., formula and defined-value clauses) and are
used in an assortment of different contexts (e.g., in last wills and testaments
and gift assignments), they essentially declare that if an IRS audit or other
event would give rise to additional tax, the transfer or transaction in
question should be recast in a manner that negates or minimizes such
unanticipated tax consequences.

1. For excellent articles that detail the nature of various tax-savings clauses, see Scott
Andrew Bowman, McCord v. Commissioner: Defined Value Clauses Redefined?, 33
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Both the IRS and courts have had mixed reactions to taxpayers' use of
such tax-savings clauses. In some contexts, the IRS has sanctioned their
use;2 in other contexts, the IRS has declared their use to be detrimental to
the viability of the tax system. 3 Courts, too, have responded in a varied
fashion to the use of tax-savings clauses-in some instances receptive to
their use, 4 and not so in others.5
Identifying the demarcation line between the permissible and the
impermissible use of tax-savings clauses is not easy. However, this
identification is important in order to protect our nation's fiscal resources.
This analysis explores taxpayers' use of such clauses and how the IRS has
responded to their use, revealing both sides' competing agendas. On the one
hand, taxpayers want to secure the most favorable tax outcome possible and
often insist upon a nontaxable "do over" of sorts if they run afoul of
governing law for whatever reason. On the other hand, the IRS harbors a
twofold concern: (1) the agency does not want to waste its limited audit
resources upon those taxpayers who are allowed ex post to reverse or
change course; and (2) it fears that sanctioning the use of tax-savings
clauses will embolden taxpayers to take aggressive tax return positions
without the downside financials risk of additional tax, interest, and
penalties.
Section II discusses the Commissioner v. Procter6 decision-a
pioneering case that involved a taxpayer's use of a tax-savings clausefollowed by a discussion of its progeny. Section III details the Wandry v.

ACTEC J. 169 (2007); Wendy Gerzog, Not All Defined Value Clauses Are Equal, 10 PITr.
TAX REV. 1 (2013).
2. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 64-19, 1964-1 C.B. 682 (sanctions the use of formula marital
deduction bequests); Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(b)(1)(ii)(B) (sanctions defining the annuity
amount in terms of a percentage of the finally determined fair market value of the assets
transferred to the grantor-retained annuity trust); Treas. Reg. § 1.664-2(a)(1)(iii) ("The stated
dollar amount may be expressed as a fraction or a percentage of the initial net fair market
value of property irrevocably passing in trust as finally determined for federal tax
purposes."); Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-3(c) (sanctioning the use of formula disclaimers).
3. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 86-41, 1986-1 C.B. 300 (The IRS refused to permit two
different valuation-adjustment clauses that pertained to putative real estate transfers. The
first clause instructed that the donee would transfer back to the taxpayer that portion of the
real estate necessary to make the value of the gift $1,000, and the second clause required that
the transferee pay to the transferor cash equal to the value of the property in excess of
$1,000. The IRS premised its disallowance on the fact that each transfer was subject to an
impermissible condition subsequent, namely, an IRS audit.); Rev. Rul. 65-144, 1965-1 C.B.
442 (held void a tax-savings clause that provided substantial modification of trust terms
(subsequent to an IRS audit) to the extent necessary to qualify a transfer made into trust for
the gift tax charitable deduction under Code § 2522).
4. See infra Section II.B.2.
5. See infra Section II.B..
6. Comm'r v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944).
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Commissioner7 decision and its possible profound effect upon tax-savings
clause usage. An analysis of existing case and administrative law leads to
the conclusion that reforms are in order. In Section IV, this analysis
presents criteria upon which tax-savings clauses should be evaluated and
proposes various administrative reforms and judicial approaches that would
elucidate this otherwise opaque area of the law. Finally, Section V
concludes.
II. TAX-SAVINGS CLAUSES AND THEIR HERITAGE
Tax-savings clauses did not come about by accident. To the contrary,
almost since the inception of the income tax, taxpayers have sought ways to
insulate themselves from tax consequences they could not anticipate. In a
perfect world for taxpayers, tax-savings clauses would enable taxpayers to
get to the exact "line" of paying the least possible tax resulting from a
transaction or transfer and not a penny more. However, finding the "Holy
Grail" of the perfect tax-savings clause that would achieve this goal has
proven elusive.
In Section A, we discuss Commissioner v. Procter, a case that many
commentators contend was the first detailed judicial examination of a taxsavings clause. In Section B, we examine Procter'sprogeny and how it has
shaped the evolution of tax-savings clauses and the demarcation line
between those tax-savings clauses that courts have ruled to be permissible
and those that are not.
A. Commissioner v. Procter
In Procter, the taxpayer's grandfather established two trusts, one inter
vivos and the other testamentary.9 The corpus of the inter vivos trust was
$928,593.70, and the value of the testamentary trust was $961,552.68.10
The taxpayer, aged thirty-six, was entitled to receive (i) the corpus of the
first trust upon the death of his mother, aged sixty-three, and (ii) the latter
trust in the event that he survived his mother and attained the age of forty."
Unrelated to the two trusts, the taxpayer apparently was greatly indebted to
his mother; as a result, the taxpayer issued demand notes to his mother
equal to $686,300.03 (i.e., the amount of his debt), secured by the
taxpayer's remainder interest in the two trusts established by his
grandfather.12

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Wandry v. Comm'r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1472 (2012).
See Procter, 142 F.2d at 824.
Id. at 825.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Several years after the grandfather's trusts were formed and funded and
the taxpayer became indebted to his mother, the taxpayer established a trust
for the benefit of his two children. 3 The taxpayer funded this newly
established trust with his remainder interest in the two trusts established by
his grandfather. 14 Once the actuarial computations of the taxpayer's
remainder interest in his grandfather's trusts and his mother's security
interest therein were each taken into account, the taxpayer averred that his
assignment to fund the newly established trust did not result in the
imposition of gift tax.15 Furthermore, the taxpayer took the position that
even if there were a putative gift tax due, the following tax-savings clause
embedded in the terms of the newly established trust negated the imposition
of such tax:
Eleventh: The settlor is advised by counsel and satisfied that the present
transfer is not subject to Federal gift tax. However, in the event it should
be determined by final judgment or order of a competent federal court of
last resort that any part of the transfer in trust hereunder is subject to gift
tax, it is agreed by all the parties hereto that in that event the excess
property hereby transferred which is decreed by such court to be subject to
gift tax, shall automatically be deemed not to be included in the
conveyance in trust hereunder and shall remain the sole property of
Frederic W. Procter free from the trust hereby created. 16
The IRS disputed the taxpayer's assertion that there was no attendant gift
tax associated with the taxpayer's assignment; furthermore, the IRS claimed
that the aforementioned tax-savings clause was ineffectual."
In its first leg of analysis, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit devised a methodology to compute the amount, if any, of the
taxpayer's gift.18 Any gift would be valued by determining the taxpayer's
present interest in both of the trusts established by his grandfather,
subtracted by the debt owed to the taxpayer's mother.' 9 The Fourth Circuit
then remanded the case back to the Tax Court for a ruling consistent with
these computational instructions.20
In the second leg of its analysis, the Fourth Circuit examined whether
the taxpayer's tax-savings clause would come into play to negate that

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 826.
16. Id. at 827.
17. Id. at 825.
18. Id. at 826.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 828. On remand, the amount of the taxable gift was determined to be
$166,400.58; and, after applying the then-specific exemption of $40,000, a gift tax in the
amount of $10,566.07 was deemed due and owing. 4 T.C.M. 359 (1945).
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portion of the assignment, if any, that might give rise to a taxable gift. 21
Given the absence of any provision in the Internal Revenue Code ("Code")
addressing the use of such a clause, the Fourth Circuit was forced to create
out of whole cloth a rule that tax-savings clauses of this nature violated
public policy. It delineated three reasons why this clause (and, presumably,
those sharing similar characteristics) would not be allowed to stand.22 First,
were the application of this clause upheld, it would undermine IRS
enforcement efforts (i.e., any time the agency devoted its limited resources
to collecting tax, such efforts would be for naught).23 Second, the
enforcement of this clause would undermine justice as it would require
courts "to pass upon a moot case" 2 4 (i.e., if the court were to rule that there
was a taxable gift, the gift theoretically would be undone; yet because the
donees were not party to the court action, this ruling would not be
enforceable upon them). Third, enforcement of this clause would cause the
court to render a declaratory judgment, which the Fourth Circuit held was
beyond its jurisdiction.2 5
The three aforementioned concerns articulated by the Procter court
have formed the backbone of what commentators now commonly refer to
as the public policy doctrine. 26 This doctrine declares that taxpayers'

21. Id. at 827.
22. Id. Almost since the advent of the income tax, courts have pondered the role of
public policy in making statutory interpretations. Indeed, there are pre- and post- Procter
cases that examine whether business deductions should be disallowed in those instances
where such deductions might harm the general welfare. See, e.g., Great N. Ry. Co. v.
Comm'r, 8 B.T.A. 225 (1927), aff'd, 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1930) (penalties for violating
statutes and regulations held not deductible from railway company's net income as operating
expenses); Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958) (upheld the
disallowance of deductions claimed by taxpayers for fines and penalties imposed upon them
for violating state penal statutes because to allow a deduction in those circumstances would
have directly and substantially diluted the actual punishment imposed). But the U.S.
Supreme Court has also made clear that use of the public policy doctrine should be
restricted. See, e.g., Tank Truck Rentals v. Comm'r, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958) (finding that the
"test of nondeductibility always is the severity and immediacy of the frustration resulting
from allowance of the deduction"); Lilly v. Comm'r, 343 U.S. 90, 97 (1952) (finding that the
"policies frustrated must be national or state policies evidenced by some governmental
declaration of them"); Comm'r v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943) (only where the
allowance of a deduction would "frustrate sharply defined national or state policies
proscribing particular types of conduct" should a court uphold the disallowance of such a
deduction).
23. Procter, 142 F.2d at 827.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 827-28.
26. See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Sherman, 'Tis a Gift to Be Simple: The Need for a New
Definition of "Future Interest" for Gift Tax Purposes, 55 U. CiN. L. REv. 585, 633-34
(1987) (explaining the Procterdecision and its public policy concerns).
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clauses and actions that endanger the public's well-being are not sanctioned
under the Code and are therefore disallowed.27 Because this doctrine was
judicially created, however, courts have been circumspect in not
overstepping their bounds-a point that the United States Supreme Court
affirmed in Commissioner v. Tellier.2 8 In Tellier, a taxpayer was criminally
charged for his illegal security-trading activities.29 The issue that the
Supreme Court had to address was whether the taxpayer could deduct the
legal expenses associated with his criminal defense under Code Section 162
(which permits the deduction of "ordinary and necessary" business
expenses).3 0 The IRS claimed that public policy concerns-i.e., the
deductibility of such legal expenses might foster criminal behaviorprohibited such deductibility. 31 The Supreme Court, however, admonished
the IRS and ruled to the contrary; it pointed out that construing statutor
law in accordance with public policy concerns should be done sparingly32
and, as applied to deductions, should only be employed when the danger to
the public is severe and immediate.3 3
Going forward, in light of the Tellier decision, if the IRS was to invoke
the public policy doctrine (including attacking tax-savings clauses), the
agency would have to demonstrate with specificity how the public might be
endangered and the grave risks at stake. Vague and undocumented concerns
simply would not suffice. The message of the Supreme Court was clear: the
IRS was at liberty to invoke the public policy doctrine to challenge a
taxpayer's position, but the agency would only prevail if the fundamental
fabric of the tax system was in jeopardy of being tattered.
In the section that follows, with the Procter and Tellier decisions in
mind, this Article investigates why the IRS prevailed in some cases
involving tax-savings clauses and why taxpayers were successful in others.

27. For an excellent exposition of the public policy doctrine, see Note, Business
Expenses, Disallowance,and PublicPolicy: Some Problems of Sanctioning with the Internal
Revenue Code, 72 YALE L.J. 108 (1962).
28. Comm'r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
29. Id. at 687.
30. Id. at 688.
31. Id.
32. Id.; see Richardson v. Mellish, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (Ex. 1824) (Burrough, J.))
("Public policy is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know
where it will carry you. It may lead you from the sound law. It is never argued at all, but
when other points fail."), quoted in E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 326 (3d ed. 1999).
33. Tellier, 383 U.S. at 694.
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B. The Progeny of Procter
In their decisions, judges often remind their readers that the practice of
tax is filled with unexpected and nettlesome land mines and complexity.3 4
The financial ramifications for running afoul of these land mines and such
complexities are often sinificant: taxpayers face potential additional tax,
interest,s and penalties; and tax practitioners must endure potential
financial penalties37 and professional liability exposure.38 In light of these
financial stakes, legal documents are often infused with prophylactic
measures that are specifically designed to safeguard against such
unanticipated tax outcomes.
In this section of the analysis, we catalog controversies between the
IRS and taxpayers involving tax-savings clauses, bifurcating our analysis
into: (1) those cases in which the IRS prevailed; and (2) those cases in
which taxpayers prevailed.
1. The IRS Prevailed and Voided the Use of a Tax-Savings Clause
There are several cases in which the IRS was able to convince courts
that a tax-savings clause should either be ignored or voided. In
chronological order, the three most important cases are: (a) Harwood v.
Commissioner;4 0 (b) Ward v. Commissioner;41 and (c) Estate of McLendon
42
v. Commissioner.

34. See, e.g., Peracchi v. Comm'r, 143 F.3d 487, 488 (9th Cir. 1998) ("We must
unscramble a Rubik's Cube of corporate tax law to determine the basis of a note contributed
by a taxpayer to his wholly-owned corporation."); O'Bryan v. Comm'r, 75 T.C. 304, 306
(1980) ("Like many simple rules, the rule contained in section 642(h)(2), when applied to a
concrete set of facts, creates an enigma.").
35. I.R.C. § 6601 (2006).
36. Id. §§ 6651-64.
37. Id. § 6694.
38. See generally Jay A. Soled, Tax Shelter Malpractice Cases and Their Implications
for Tax Compliance, 58 AM. U. L. REv. 267 (2008) (explaining how tax practitioners face
potential liability claims if their clients are audited and bear additional tax, interest, and
penalties).
39. To date, the majority of adjudicated cases involve transfer tax issues. However, as
tax-savings clauses grow in popularity, we anticipate that future disputes will encompass
other areas of tax law.
40. Harwood v. Comm'r, 82 T.C. 239 (1984), aff'd without published opinion, 786
F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1986).
41. Ward v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 78 (1986).
42. Estate of McLendon v. Comn'r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 946 (1993), rev'd on other
grounds, 77 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 1995).
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a. Harwood v. Commissioner
In Harwood, taxpayers had gifted limited partnership interests into
trusts established for the benefit of their children.4 3 The Tax Court's first
task was to ascertain the fair market value of these gifted limited
partnership interests." After the court conducted this valuation analysis, it
had to determine the validity of a tax-savings clause.45 The clause required
the trustees to issue a promissory note to the taxpayer donors equal to the
difference between the contributed property's reported value for gift tax
purposes and the property's actual fair market value if the two following
conjunctive conditions were both met: (i) a final determination that the
contributed property to the limited partnership exceeded $400,000; and (ii)
"in the opinion of the [a]ttorney for the trustee a lower value is not
reasonably defendable."
In analyzing the tax implications associated with the use of this taxsavings clause, the Tax Court examined whether these conjunctive
conditions had both been met.47 Because the fair market value of the limited
partnership interests was determined to be $1,278,826.50, which was well
in excess of the reported $400,000 value, the first condition was obviously
met.48 The second condition, however, was not satisfied because the
attorney for the trustee apparently believed that the reported value was
defendable. 49 This latter point was evidenced by the fact that the trustee had
not issued a promissory note equal to $878,826.50 (the contributed
property's fair market value of $1,278,826.50 less its reported value of
$400,000) to the taxpayer donors who had made the trust contribution.
In analyzing the effect, if any, of the tax-savings clause, the Tax Court
distinguished the facts of this case from those found in Procter.1 It pointed
out that the structure of the Harwood tax-savings clause was different from
52
the tax-savings clause used by the taxpayers in Procter.
In particular, the
effect of the Procter tax-savings clause would have been to undo a portion
of the initial transfer (i.e., after the court decision was rendered, a portion of
the property theoretically was supposed to be returned to the donor).53 In
contrast, in Harwood, if the tax-savings clause took effect, it was designed

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Harwood,82 T.C. at 239.
Id. at 242.
Id.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 273.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to come into play immediately after a property appraisal was made or the
IRS had conducted an audit-not after a judicial decision was rendered.54
Here, because the trustee did not issue a promissory note to the taxpayer
donors (which might have neqated the putative additional gift), the taxsavings clause was ineffectual. s The Tax Court therefore issued a narrow
ruling based upon the facts before it, holding that the tax-savings clause in
question was a nullity, skirting the larger issue regarding its validity.56
b. Ward v. Commissioner
In Ward, the Tax Court was confronted with facts similar to Harwood.
The taxpayers had transferred interests in a closely held business to their
children, and the Tax Court was called upon to ascertain the fair market
value of such interests and the validity of a tax-savings clause.57 After a
lengthy discussion of the numerous factors that shape the fair market value
of closely held business interests, the Tax Court reached the conclusion that
the per share value reported for gift tax purposes ($2,000 for all tax years
involved) was below that of the actual fair market value per share ($2,207
for 1979, $2,288 for 1980, and $2,295 for 1981), and hence there was a
potential gift tax deficiency.58
Despite the Tax Court's valuation finding, the taxpayers argued that
they should nevertheless prevail and that no gift tax should be assessed.59
The taxpayers first asserted that they had intended to transfer $50,000 to
each of their sons rather than a specific number of shares.60 The Tax Court
did not find this argument persuasive insofar as the gift tax return
specifically referred to the transferred shares rather than a specific dollar
amount. 61 Second, the taxpayers argued that a tax-savings clause that was
part of the transfer documents negated the taxable gift.6 2 More specifically,
the taxpayers pointed out that while they had transferred twenty-five shares
of company stock to each of their children, they reserved the right to revoke
a part of each gift if it was "finally determined for Fift tax purposes" that
the fair market value of each share exceeded $2,000.6

54. Id.
55. Id. at 275.
56. Id.
57. Ward v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 78 (1986).
58. Id. at 109.
59. Id. at 109-10.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 110. See also Knight v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 506 (2000) (rejecting the
taxpayer's argument based on a tax-savings clause in light of the taxpayer's indication on the
gift tax return that shares had been gifted rather than a defined-value amount).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 110 n.10.
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The Tax Court found this power to revest the company shares in the
taxpayers problematic for two reasons. First of all, it was far from clear if
this revesting power would ever take effect; in particular, the court was
confident that had the IRS not conducted an audit, the activation of this
provision would have remained untapped.6 4 More troubling to the court,
however, was the fact that even if it upheld the clause's validity, "the
Commissioner has no power to compel the donor to reclaim a portion of the
property." 5 Put differently, in the aftermath of the court's decision, the
donees of the property (namely, the taxpayers' children) might simply have
refused to return the property, thus rendering the opinion of the Tax Court a
nullity. In accordance with Procter, the Tax Court determined the taxsavings clause to be deemed void rather than have its holding become an
exercise in judicial futility.
c. Estate of McLendon v. Commissioner
The facts of McLendon are remarkably similar to those of Harwoodand
Ward. Once again, the Tax Court was called upon to value closely held
business interests and to decide the validity of a tax-savings clause. In
McLendon, the taxpayer was stricken with a deadly form of cancer. In
light of his severe illness, in return for a private annuity, the taxpayer sold
family partnership interests to his son and the trustee of a trust established
for the benefit of his daughters.67 The Tax Court first went through the
difficult exercise of determining the actual fair market value of the interests
that were sold by the taxpayer in exchange for the private annuity.68 The
Tax Court concluded that the fair market value of the transferred assets
greatly exceeded the annuity purchase price, thus triggering a possible gift
tax exposure. 69
In anticipation that the IRS might make a valuation challenge, the
taxpayer had inserted a tax-savings clause into the purchase agreement.70
The clause essentially declared that if the IRS or Tax Court arrived at a
different fair market value than the one used for computation of the private
annuity amount, the purchase price would be adjusted by the difference.7 1

64. Id. at 111.
65. Id. at 113.
66. Estate of McLendon v. Comm'r, 135 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 1998).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1019.
69. For example, were the fair market value of the transferred assets $500,000 and the
fair market value of the private annuity $100,000, the potential gift tax exposure would be
on $400,000 ($500,000 less $100,000).
70. Estate ofMcLendon, 135 F.3d at 1019.
7 1. Id.
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In the taxpayer's opinion, application of this clause would negate the
imposition of any gift tax. 2
After reviewing the outcomes in both Procter and Ward and
distinguishing the presented facts from those found in the King decision
(see below),7 the Tax Court summarily dismissed the tax-savings clause as
being null and void.74 The reasons for its holding closely echo the Ward
decision. The Tax Court first declared that "it makes little sense to expend
precious judicial resources to resolve the question of whether a gift resulted
from the private annuity transaction only to render the issue moot." 75 The
Tax Court then added that "our determination that the private annuity
agreement resulted in a taxable gift is not directly binding on [the donees]
who are not parties to this case. Consequently, there being no assurance that
the terms of the adjustment clause will be respected .... 76 The Tax Court
did want to be placed in the uncomfortable position of rendering a decision
that did not result in the imposition of gift tax and could be blithely ignored
by the donees who had been directly enriched by the transfer.77
In each of the foregoing cases, the common denominator was the
cautionary nature of the judiciary. If the taxpayers in these cases prevailed,
the transfer of virtually any difficult-to-value asset would be accompanied
by some sort of tax-savings clause or agreement seeking to undo unforeseen
gift tax exposure arising from an IRS audit. The Harwood, Ward, and
McLendon courts rejected this loophole: if a transfer was made and the
reported gift was inaccurate, the taxpayers were going to have to bear the
concomitant transfer tax consequences and associated valuation risks of gift
giving. Effectively, under these decisions, no tax-savings clause or
agreement could shield taxpayers from taking aggressive transfer tax
valuation-reporting positions.
2. The Taxpayer Prevailed and the Use of a
Tax-Savings Clause Was Upheld
The Procterdecision had a chilling effect upon taxpayers attempting to
use tax-savings clauses. Indeed, the Procter holding pertaining to the

72. Id.
73. King v. United States, 545 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1976).
74. Estate of McLendon v. Comm'r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 946 (1993).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Estate of Focardi v. Comm'r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 936 (2006) (taxpayers
inserted a tax-savings clause into a grantor retained annuity trust that declared void a spousal
interest were that interest later deemed to be nonqualified under the Code and associated
Treasury regulations; the Tax Court ruled that such a clause was null and void, "and we give
it no respect").
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validity of a tax-savings clause was not cited by a reported case for another
quarter of a century.
This section of the analysis again catalogs court controversies between
the IRS and taxpayers, but this time explores cases in which taxpayers
prevailed. In chronological order, the four most important cases are as
follows: (a) King v. United States;7 8 (b) McCord v. Commissioner;79 (c
Estate of Christiansenv. Commissioner; and (d) Petter v. Commissioner.
a. King v. United States
After Procter, the next case to examine the validity of a tax-savings
82
clause was King v. United States. In King, the taxpayer sold 1,600,000
shares of closely held stock, valued at $1.25 per share, to trusts that he had
established for the benefit of his children. In the stock purchase
agreement, there was a "price adjustment clause" declaring that the price
per share would be upwardly or downwardly adjusted if the IRS determined
that a higher or lower price was appropriate.84 Upon audit, the IRS declared
that the actual fair market value price per share was $16 (twelve times
higher than the dollar figure reported by the taxpayer), resulting in a $14.75
per share gift ($16 - $1.25) to the trusts-a total taxable gift of $23,600,000
(1,600,000 x $14.75).85

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had to
consider whether the tax-savings clause in the stock purchase agreement
should be upheld.8 6 In its decision, the Tenth Circuit was impressed by the
district court's factual finding that the taxpayer intended that the trusts pay
full and adequate consideration for the stock (i.e., there was an absence of
donative intent on the taxpayers' part), "and that the [tax-savings] clause
was a proper means of overcoming the uncertainty in ascertaining the fair
market value of the stock."87 The Tenth Circuit then distinguished this taxsavings clause from the clause in Procter.88 The tax-savings clause before
the court did not "attempt to alter or negate the plain terms of the valuation
clause and no attempt by the trustees was made to reconvey the stock to

78.
79.
80.
81.
(9th Cir.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

King, 545 F.2d at 700.
McCord v. Comm'r, 461 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 2006).
Estate of Christiansen v. Comm'r, 130 T.C. 1 (2008).
Estate of Petter v. Comm'r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 534 (2009), af'd, 653 F.3d 1012
2011).
King, 545 F.2d at 700.
Id. at 704.
Id. at 703-04.
Id. at 704.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 705.
Id.
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King or to cancel the notes in anticipation of an unfavorable valuation
ruling."89 Put another way, when the taxpayer sold the stock to the trusts,
the transaction was complete because ownership of the stock had vested in
the donee. 90 If, upon audit, the IRS found the sales price for the stock was
too low, the purchasing trust would have to pay more for the stock; or if the
IRS found that the reported sales price was too high, the taxpayers could
demand to be reimbursed. 9' In upholding the tax-savings clause's validity,92
the Tenth Circuit did not seem bothered by the fact that after the IRS audit
was conducted and the court's decision was rendered, the taxpayer and the
trustee of the trust could conspire to ignore the court's holding (which is
apparently what happened).93
b. McCord v. Commissioner
Notwithstanding the issuance of the King decision, several courts
considered its holding suspect.9 4 Furthermore, taxpayers attempting to
employ tax-savings clauses were met with crushing defeats in Harwood,95
Ward, 6 and McLendon 97 casting doubt on the utility of tax-savings clauses
in general. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit then
rendered a decision in McCord v. Commissioner,98 which, despite not

89. Id.
90. Id.
9 1. Id.
92. Id. at 706.
93. Another unstated factor that may have played a pivotal role in the court's protaxpayer decision was that by the time the King case was adjudicated, the company whose
shares had been sold in return for the private annuity had gone bankrupt. King v. United
States, 545 F.2d 700, 703 (10th Cir. 1976). It is likely that holding the taxpayers liable for
gift tax on the initial transaction seemed palpably unfair to the court. See, e.g., Ward v.
Comm'r, 87 T.C. 78, 115 (1986) ("It appears that the taxpayer and the trusts made no
attempt to make a price adjustment, but the adjustment would have been an empty formality,
since the trust corpus-shares in the corporation, which was bankrupt by the time of trialwas worthless.").
94. Ward, 87 T.C. at 116 ("The factual findings supporting the holding in King are
open to question." (footnote omitted)); Harwood v. Comm'r, 82 T.C. 239, 271 n.23 (1984),
aff'd without published opinion, 786 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1986) ("We question whether the
buyer's willingness to pay whatever amount the IRS determined the stock to be worth
evidences an arm's-length transaction. If anything, it tends to show that the trustee did not
bargain at arm's length with the trust grantor, since the trustee evidently did not care what
price it paid for the stock, but cared only that no gift tax be incurred by the grantor-seller.").
95. Harwood,82 T.C. at 239.
96. Ward, 87 T.C. at 78.
97. Estate of McLendon v. Comm'r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 946 (1993).
98. McCord v. Comm'r, 461 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 2006).
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directly addressing the validity of these clauses, paradoxically led to their
acceptance in later Tax Court decisions.
By way of background, the taxpayers in McCord established a limited
partnership, McCord Interests, Ltd. ("ML"), for estate planning reasons.99
In return for partnership interests, the husband and wife taxpayers
contributed $12,294,384 (or $6,147,192 apiece) to ML.'00 Marketable
securities comprised approximately 65 percent of the value of the
contributed assets with real estate comprising approximately 30 percent of
the value of the contributed assets.' 0
Using an assignment agreement, the taxpayers then assigned their ML
limited partnership interests using a formulaic approach. 0 2 The taxpayers'
children and trusts established for the benefit of the taxpayers'
grandchildren (noncharitable beneficiaries) were to receive gifted interests
having an aggregate fair market value of $6,910,933.103 If the fair market
value of the gifted ML interests exceeded this dollar threshold, the
Shreveport Symphony, Inc. ("SS") was to receive a portion of the gifted
interest having a fair market value equal to such excess up to $134,000.'0
After the prior two allocations, any remaining undistributed ML interests
were to pass to the Communities Foundation of Texas, Inc. ("CFT").05
Because of their tax-exempt status, assignments to the latter two
distributees would qualify for the unlimited gift tax charitable deduction. 0 6
By inserting this formula clause, the taxpayers aspired to cap the
amount of their taxable gift at $6,910,933.107 More specifically, even if the
IRS was to challenge the reported fair market value of the ML interests
that were assigned to the noncharitable beneficiaries, the audit would not
produce any additional transfer tax.'08 Instead, any excess value
determination by the IRS would result in additional MIL interests passing
from the noncharitable beneficiaries to the charitable beneficiaries (SS and
CFT), thereby qualifying for the gift tax charitable deduction.
Several months after the taxpayers assigned their MIL interests, the
assignees of the gifts (both charitable and noncharitable) entered into a
"confirmation agreement." 109 In this agreement, each party agreed to a
putative value of the ML interest assigned by the taxpayers and, based

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 616.
Id.
McCord v. Comm'r, 120 T.C. 358, 361 (2003).
McCord,461 F.3d at 618.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 619.
I.R.C. § 2522 (2006).
See McCord,461 F.3d at 618.
Id. at 618-19; see I.R.C. § 2522 (2006).
McCord, 461 F.3d at 618.
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upon that valuation determination, allocated percentage interests in ML
that were to pass to noncharitable beneficiaries SS and CFT.11 0 Upon audit,
among other things, the IRS challenged the reported fair market value of
the ML interests that were assigned as well as the tax-savings formula
clause that appeared to neutralize the tax effect of any upward valuation
adjustment.
The IRS prevailed in Tax Court.'12 As is typical in cases involving
transfers of closely held business interests, the court initially attempted to
ascertain the fair market value of ML interests by addressing the intricacies
of minority and marketability discounts and the accuracy of each party's
professional experts.' 3 After this lengthy discussion, the court arrived at a
significantly higher fair market value for the MIL interests than the
taxpayers' reported value.' 14 Using this higher valuation, the Tax Court then
declared that the donor taxpayers were liable for additional gift tax based
upon the ML percentage interests that were allocated to the noncharitable
beneficiaries pursuant to the confirmation agreement.1 15 In ruling for the
IRS, the Tax Court majority did not find it necessary to address the
application of the tax-savings clause and the Procter decision. 116 Because
the tax-savings clause in question did not use the phrase "as finally
determined for gift tax purposes,""' the Tax Court majority apparently
concluded that the court's determination of value could not affect the
amount passing to charity." 8 As a result, the taxpayer could not use the
clause to negate the IRS deficiency." 9
12
Judge Foley, in a strong-worded dissent, sided with the taxpayer. 0 He
maintained that the defined-value clause used in McCord was different
from the condition-subsequent clause used in Procterand Ward and that its
failure to include the "finally determined" phrase was inconsequential.121 In
Judge Foley's view, the McCord clause had to be read as if it contained the
proper phraseology.12 2 Judge Foley also suggested that because the
confirmation agreement was executed after the date of the gift, it could not

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
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Id.
Id. at 621.
McCord v. Comm'r, 120 T.C. 358 (2003).
Id. at 373-95.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 424-25.
Id. at 397.
Id.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 416 (Foley, J., dissenting).
Id. at 420, 424.
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be taken into account based on the inveterate gift tax principle that post-gift
events are not relevant to the question of value. 23
Relying almost entirely upon Judge Foley's dissent, the Fifth Circuit
reversed the Tax Court and thereby laid the groundwork for later taxpayeru
friendly opinions. 124 Lk
Like Judge
Foley, the Fifth Circuit applied the taxsavings clause, finding that the charities would be entitled to receive all
value in excess of the amount stipulated in the gift documents.125 More
specifically, the taxpayers had given each noncharitable donee a specific
dollar amount via a "defined value" clause.126 The designated dollar
amounts to the noncharitable beneficiaries were to be funded with MIL
interests-which were admittedly difficult to value-but, in the opinion of
the Fifth Circuit, not a single dollar more than $6,910,933.127
On the basis of this finding, the Fifth Circuit ruled in the taxpayers'
favor and capped the taxpayers' gift tax exposure at the dollar figure
stipulated in the gift document.12 8 As such, the IRS proposed deficiency
was invalidated.' 2 Unlike Judge Foley, however, the Fifth Circuit did not
reach the Procter issue (namely, whether the public policy doctrine would
render the operative tax-savings clause void); instead, it explicitly noted
that the IRS had not pressed this argument on appeal.130 (Parenthetically, of
course, this suggests that the Fifth Circuit contemplated that, in future cases
involving a defined-value tax-savings clause, the IRS would be free to
pursue this argument.)
c. Estate of Christiansen v. Commissioner
Several years after the McCord decision, the Tax Court echoed Judge
Foley's dissent in Estate of Christiansen v. Commissioner3 ' by beginning
to express skepticism toward Procter and the IRS position that tax-savings
clauses should generally be ignored. The Christiansen taxpayer had died,
bequeathing her estate to her daughter.13 2 Under the terms of the taxpayer's
will, if her daughter disclaimed all or part of her inheritance, 75 percent of

123. Id. at 417; see, e.g., Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929)
("[T]he value of the thing to be taxed must be estimatedas of the time when the act is done."
(emphasis added)).
124. McCord v. Comm'r, 461 F.3d 614, 632 (5th Cir. 2006).
125. Id. at 628.
126. Id. at 624.
127. Id. at 632.
128. Id. at 628.
129. Id. at 632.
130. Id. at 631.
131. Estate of Christiansen v. Comm'r, 130 T.C. 1 (2008), aff'd, 586 F.3d 1061 (8th
Cir. 2009).
132. Id. at 2.
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her disclaimed assets would pass to a charitable lead trust (in which the
daughter was the remainder beneficiary) and 25 percent of such disclaimed
assets would pass to a charitable foundation.133
Upon the taxpayer's demise, the daughter timelr disclaimed the entirety
of taxpayer's estate but for the sum of $6,350,000.1 Under the terms of the
taxpayer's will, the balance of her estate was to pass to the charitable lead
trust and a charitable foundation, and it was claimed that each of these
bequests qualified for the estate tax charitable deduction. 35
The IRS subsequently audited the taxpayer's estate.136 After
investigating and challenging the reported gross estate value of
$6,512,223.20, the IRS and estate agreed that the estate's actual gross value
was instead $9,578,895.93 (approximately 50 percent larger than the
taxpayer's initial reported value).13 7 Because the taxpayer had retained
$6,350,000 and disclaimed the balance of her mother's estate, the
reevaluation of the decedent's estate meant that the charitable lead trust and
the charitable foundation were entitled to additional assets (i.e., the
difference between $9,578,895.93 (the revised fair market of the estate) and
$6,350,000 (the value of the disclaimed assets)).138 In the estate's opinion,
the additional sums that would pass to the charitable beneficiaries would
give rise to an augmented estate tax charitable deduction. 39
The IRS demurred.140 First, the IRS pointed out that the value of any
asset passing to the charitable lead trust would not qualify for the estate tax
charitable deduction.141 Citing Treasury Regulation Section 25.25182(e)(3), the IRS averred that the disclaimer that the taxpayer had issued in
favor of the charitable lead trust was not qualified because the taxpayer
possessed a contingent remainder interest in the trust.142 More specifically,
the Code and Treasury regulations did not permit taxpayers to disclaim any
property in which the have retained an interest therein. 141 On this point, the
Nevertheless, the taxpayer contended that the
Tax Court agreed.'
following tax-savings clause embedded in the terms of the disclaimer
qualified the disclaimed assets for the estate tax charitable deduction:
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137.
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139.
140.
141.
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Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.; see I.R.C. § 2055(a) (2006).
Estate of Christiansen,130 T.C. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9-10; Treas. Reg. § 25.2518(e)(3) (1988).
Estate of Christiansen,130 T.C. at 9; Treas. Reg. § 25.2518(e)(3) (1988).
Estate of Christiansen,130 T.C. at 13.
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[To] the extent that the disclaimer set forth above in this instrument is not
effective to make it a qualified disclaimer, [the taxpayer's daughter]
hereby takes such actions to the extent necessary to make the disclaimer
set forth above a qualified disclaimer within the meaning of section 2518
of the Code.14 5
The taxpayer's position was that this tax-savings clause affected a
disclaimer of the contingent remainder interest that had precluded the
taxpayer from securing the estate tax charitable deduction. 14 6 The Tax Court
nevertheless held this tax-savings clause ineffectual.147 On the one hand, if
its decision gave effect to this clause, the disclaimer would not be timely
(i.e., because the Tax Court decision was being issued several years after
the decedent's death, it failed to meet the permissible nine-month time
frame to be qualified). 148 On the other hand, if this tax-savings clause was
construed to be effective retroactively, in accordance with Code Section
2518(b), the disclaimer would still not be qualified because it would have
failed to have properly identified the disclaimed property (i.e., the
nonqualified trust remainder interest).14 9
Having failed on the first issue (namely, qualifying the disclaimed
assets passing to the charitable lead trust for the estate tax charitable
deduction), the taxpayer next sought to qualify the additional funds flowing
to the charitable foundation for the estate tax charitable deduction.150 In her
disclaimer, the decedent's daughter had inserted another protective taxsavings clause, namely, that the fair market value of the disclaimed
property would be as "such value . . . finally determined for federal estate

tax purposes.'' Citing to Procter, the IRS claimed that this clause was
void as contrary to public policy.152
Ruling in the taxpayer's favor, the Tax Court did not find the IRS's
argument to be persuasive on four different grounds. First, citing to Tellier,
the Tax Court pointed out that in construing statutory language, the public
policy doctrine should be employed sparingly. 5 3 Second, the effect of
upholding this tax-savings clause would increase the amount of funds that
would pass to charity, something that public policy generally favored.15 4
Third, the court differentiated this case from Procter insofar as that case
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Id. at 5.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.; I.R.C. §§ 2046, 2518 (2006).
I.R.C. § 2518 (2006); Estate of Christiansen, 130 T.C. at 13.
Estate of Christiansen,130 T.C. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 16.
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sought to undo a transfer whereas the contested phrase in Christiansen
would simply reallocate property passing from the decedent between and
among the decedent's daughter, the charitable trust, and the foundation." 5
Finally, the court contended that there were many safeguards already in
place (e.g., the fiduciary role that estate executors play under state law, the
oversight role that a state's attorney general is supposed to undertake to
protect against misappropriated charitable assets, and the IRS's ability to
impose sanctions against charitable institutions that engage in self-dealing)
to ensure that the court's ruling, once rendered, would not be ignored even
by those parties who were not named in the litigation. 15 6
d Petter v. Commissioner
In Petter v. Commissioner,'5 7 the Tax Court extended the scope of the
pro-taxpayer analysis in Christiansenand once again held in favor of the
taxpayer. In Petter, the taxpayer formed a limited liability company funded
with publicly held United Parcel Service ("UPS") stock for the admitted
purpose of trying to diminish the value of her intended gifts to her children
(i.e., by transferring her interests in a limited liability company rather than
in publicly traded stock, the taxpayer could avail herself of valuation
discounts).' 58 The taxpayer then gifted some of her limited company
interests to trusts established for the benefit of her children and sold other
shares to trusts that were likewise established for her children. 59
In the case of the gift, the taxpayer employed the following formula
approach: she assigned to her children a dollar value for her remaining
unused applicable exclusion amount (i.e., the amount that could pass free of
transfer tax) to be funded with interests in the limited liability company,
with the balance of the assigned stock, if any, to pass to a charitable
organization (the latter transfer intended to qualify for the gift tax charitable
deduction). 60 In the case of the shares that were sold, a similar clause was
used.' 6 1 This clause provided that the number of shares passing to the trust
would be equal in value to the amount of the note i.e., the purchase price),
with the balance of the shares passing to charity.' 6 The reason for each of

155. Id. at 17.
156. Id. at 17-18.
157. Estate of Petter v. Comm'r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 534 (2009), aff'd, 653 F.3d 1012
(9th Cir. 2011).
158. Estate ofPetter,98 T.C.M. (CCH) at 535; see, e.g., Estate of Erickson v. Comm'r,
93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1175 (2007) (acknowledging the valuation benefits associated with
establishing family limited partnerships and transferring interests held therein).
159. Estate ofPetter,98 T.C.M. (CCH) at 535.
160. Id. at 537.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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these formula arrangements was strategic on the taxpayer's part: an IRS
audit that resulted in a higher valuation of a limited liability interest would
not trigger additional gift tax, but rather an augmented gift tax charitable
deduction. 63
In conducting its analysis, the Tax Court first determined the difficultto-value limited liability interests and held such interests to be worth in
excess of what the taxpayer reported.'" The IRS took the position that, for
the reasons set forth in Procter, the taxpayer's tax-savings clauses should
be void against public policy.165
Nonetheless, the Tax Court upheld their validity,'6 6 commencing its
discussion with the following declaration: "[S]avings clauses are void, but
formula clauses are fine."' It then discussed how the taxpayer had gifted a
specified dollar amount to her intended noncharitable beneficiaries and sold
property at a specified dollar amount to the trustees of the trust she had
established; in the Tax Court's opinion, an upward valuation determination
of the the limited liability interests could not alter these salient facts.' 68 The
taxpayer's fail-safe mechanism whereby the balance of transferred property
(i.e., beyond the stated threshold dollar amounts) passed to charity did not
disturb the court.16 9 To the contrary, the court pointed out that there is a
congressional public policy favoring charitable giving (citing United States
v. Benedict),17 and the named charities would be vigilant to enforce their
rights and to protect their financial interests.171 In light of these dynamics,
the Tax Court respected the tax-savings clause and held that unreported
wealth would not inure to the noncharitable beneficiaries.1 72 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in affirming, noted that the
IRS had not made a public policy argument on appeal and therefore did not
address the validity of the tax-savings clause.17 3
The common denominator in the foregoing cases was the taxpayers'
strategic use of charitable beneficiaries to absorb the excess value, if any,
that was produced as a result of an IRS audit, which had determined that the
fair market value of the gifted or purchased assets was more than what the

163. Id. at 538.
164. Id. at 540.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 544.
167. Id. at 542.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. United States v. Benedict, 338 U.S. 692, 696-97 (1950).
171. EstateofPetter, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) at 542.
172. Id. at 543.
173. Estate of Petter v. Comm'r, 653 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 2011). Shortly after the
Petter decision was issued, the Tax Court rendered an almost-identical opinion in Hendrix v.
Comm'r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1642 (2011).
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taxpayers had reported. Courts have generally assumed that donations to
charities constitute a public good that should be encouragedl 74 and,
furthermore, that charities have their own squadron of protectorates, such as
independent legal counsel and state attorneys general, that advocate on their
behalf.'75 Thus, all of the foregoing decisions were influenced by the fact
that the tax-savings clauses in question worked to benefit charity.
In the next section of the analysis, we explore the possible implications
of when a tax-savings clause directs that the difference between an asset's
actual fair market value and a taxpayer's reported value flows to a
noncharitable beneficiary rather than to a charitable beneficiary.
III. EXAMINING THE PERMISSIBLE BOUNDS OF TAX-SAVINGS CLAUSES
Over the past decade or so, many tax-savings clauses were structured
using a charitable safety valve.17 6 More specifically, if the actual fair market
value of the assets gifted or purchased exceeded their reported value, the
excess was to pass to entities that qualified for the gift tax charitable
deduction. 17 7 While these tax-savings clauses sheltered taxpayers from
additional gift tax exposure (depending upon whether or not they were
activated), they also resulted in a diversion of financial resources from the
taxpayer's family unit to charitable beneficiaries. Seeking to expand upon
the success taxpayers enjoyed in the King, McCord, Christiansen, and
Petterdecisions, resourceful taxpayers sought to devise a tax-savings clause
that could preserve wealth inside the family unit rather than cascading to
charitable beneficiaries.
In Section A, we discuss Wandry v. Commissioner 7 8 and the judicial
success taxpayers achieved in devising a tax-savings clause that preserved
wealth inside the family unit. In Section B, we critique the Wandry decision
and examine the profound implications it may have upon the use of taxsavings clauses and the future efficacy of IRS tax audits.
A. Wandry v. Commissioner
The facts of Wandry are somewhat typical of families that wish to
diminish their transfer tax exposure. To avail themselves of valuation

174. Estate of Petter, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) at 543 ("These features leave us confident that
this gift was made in good faith and in keeping with Congress's overall policy of
encouraging gifts to charities."); see also supra note 170 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., id.
176. Peter J. Walsh, Formula Clause Changes Taxable Gift into CharitableDonation,
84 PRAc. TAX STRATEGIES 212 (2010).
177. I.R.C. § 2522(a) (2006).
178. Wandry v. Comm'r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1472 (2012).
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discounts associated with the transfer of closely held business interests, 179
the taxpayers in Wandry established a limited liability company and
decided to capitalize upon the gift tax annual exclusion (at that time,
$11,000 per donee) so and the lifetime gift tax exemption (at that time, $1
million). ' The taxpayers were advised to make gifts that totaled these
dollar amounts and did so by making gifts of $261,000 to each of their four
children ($11,000 qualifying for the gift tax annual exclusion and $250,000
qualifying for the taxpayer's lifetime exemption) and $11,000 to each of
five grandchildren (qualifying each of these transfers for the gift tax annual
exclusion).182 To fund each of the foregoing gifts, the taxpayers transferred
hard-to-value membership interests in their limited liability company rather
than transferring actual cash.183
On the advice of counsel, the husband and wife taxpayers each
executed separate gift assignments. 84 These gift assignments first specified
the exact dollar amounts that were to pass to each named beneficiary and
declared that the funding of these dollar amounts was to be made with
percentage interests in the newly established limited liability company. ss
The tax-savings clause in question was worded in a formulaic fashion;
hence, the Tax Court's references to it as a "formula clause." 86 If there
were an upward valuation, the savings clause instructed that there should be
a corresponding diminishment of the limited liability company percentage
interest to be held by each named beneficiary, with the excess reallocated
back to the capital accounts of the taxpayers (i.e., the parents or
grandparents of the named beneficiaries). 87

179. See, e.g., Brant J. Hellwig, On Discounted PartnershipInterests and Adequate
Consideration, 28 VA. TAX REv. 531, 533 (2009) ("Family limited partnerships have
dominated the judicial landscape in the estate and gift tax arena for nearly a decade. . . .
Their principal advantage lies in the prospect of significant estate and gift tax savings
generated through the exploitation of discounts used to value equity interests in closely held
entities."). See generally Laura E. Cunningham, Remember the Alamo: The IRS Needs
Ammunition in Its Fight Against the FLP, 86 TAX NOTEs 1461 (2000) (describing the
legislative action needed to eliminate the transfer tax valuation advantages associated with
the use of family limited partnerships); Leo L. Schmolka, FLPs and GRATs: What to Do?,
86 TAX NOTES 1473 (2000) (proposing solutions to several transfer tax loopholes, including
more accurately valuing family limited partnerships).
180. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2006).
181. Id. § 20 10(c); Wandry, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1473.
182. Wandry, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1473.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1474.
187. The exact verbiage of the operative tax-savings clause language is as follows:
Although the number of Units gifted is fixed on the date of the gift, that number is
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In order to determine the percentage interest of the limited liability
company that was to satisfy the designated dollar amount gifted, the
taxpayers retained the services of an appraisal company.' This company
determined the fair market value of each percentage interest in the limited
liability company to be $109,000."9 Consistent with this valuation, the
taxpayers' children and grandchildren were to receive 2.39 percent and
0.101 percent membership interests, respectively, in the entity.1 90 On their
gift tax returns, the taxpayers denoted the gifts in monetary terms but also
specified the percentage interest in the limited liability company that they
used for funding purposes. 1 91
The IRS subsequently conducted an audit of the taxpayers' gift tax
returns, and together with the taxpayers agreed that the actual fair market
value of a 2.39 percent interest in the limited liability company was actually
$315,800 (not $261,000 as was reported), and the fair market value of 0.101
percent interest in the limited liability company was $13,346 (not $11,000
as was reported).192 The IRS claimed that these reevaluations of the
taxpayers' property triggered gift tax and that the formula clause in
question was ineffectual; the taxpayers demurred. 193
The questions before the Tax Court were threefold: first, whether the
taxpayers transferred a specified dollar amount or a fixed membership
percentage in the limited liability company; second, whether the limited
liability company's capital accounts should control the case outcome; and

based on the fair market value of the gifted Units, which cannot be known on the
date of the gift but must be determined after such date based on all relevant
information as of that date. Furthermore, the value determined is subject to
challenge by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). I intend to have a good-faith
determination of such value made by an independent third-party professional
experienced in such matters and appropriately qualified to make such a
determination. Nevertheless, if, after the number of gifted Units is determined
based on such valuation, the IRS challenges such valuation and a final
determination of a different value is made by the IRS or a court of law, the number
of gifted Units shall be adjusted accordingly so that the value of the number of
Units gifted to each person equals the amount set forth above, in the same manner
as a federal estate tax formula marital deduction amount would be adjusted for a
valuation redetermination by the IRS and/or a court of law.
Wandry, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1473-74.
188. Id. at 1474.
189. Id.
190. These percentages make sense in terms of what the taxpayers were seeking to
achieve; the taxpayers had sought to gift $261,000 (i.e., 2.39 x $109,000) to each child and
$11,000 to each grandchild (i.e., 0.101 x $109,000). Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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third, the effect, if any, that the formula clause would have under these
circumstances. 194 The court addressed each of these questions seriatim.
First, the court examined the nature of the gift. On the one hand, the gift
could be considered a fixed-percentage membership interest in the limited
liability company; on the other hand, the gift could be considered a
specified dollar amount.'95 If the gift were categorized as a fixed-percentage
membership interest, gift tax would arise because the acknowledged fair
market values of the membership percentage interests exceeded the
taxpayers' annual exclusion and lifetime exemption amounts.196
Conversely, if the gift were categorized as a specific dollar amount, no gift
tax would arise because the dollar denominations were not in excess of
either the annual exclusion or the taxpayers' lifetime exemption amounts. 19 7
After close examination, the Tax Court determined that the gifts were in the
form of specific dollar amounts, not membership percentage interests, even
though the gift tax return descriptions referred to membership percentage
interests being transferred.19 8 In the court's opinion, the controlling factor
was that the taxpayers had denoted the exact dollar amounts that they were
transferring to each beneficiary on the face of their gift tax returns, amounts
which were consistent with the taxpayers' intentions and the written gift
assignments.' 99
The Tax Court next scrutinized the IRS's argument that the capital
accounts of the limited liability company should be determinative of the
case's outcome.200 More specifically, since the taxpayers' and donees'
capital accounts were adjusted to reflect the percentage interests held by
each as of the initial date of the gift and the limited liability company had
consistently operated on this basis in terms of allocating annual gains and
losses, it was too late as a practical matter to reverse course.201 However, on
the basis of prior court holdings that examined what partners in those cases
actually owned rather than how profits and losses were divided between
and among them, 20 2 the Tax Court dismissed the IRS's argument, asserting

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1474.
198. Id. at 1475.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1476.
201. Id.
202. The Tax Court cited to two of its decisions to support this proposition. Id.; see
Offord v. Comm'r, 1961 T.C. (P-H) 871, 878-79 (1961) (capital account entries on a
partnership's books were not sufficient to prove the existence of a partner); Stralla v.
Comm'r, 9 T.C. 801, 819 (1947) (on the basis of facts and circumstances, partnership
interests designated as belonging to certain individuals on the partnership books and records
found to belong to someone else).
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that "capital accounts do not control the nature of petitioners' gifts to the
donees., o3
The Tax Court then examined whether the formula clause in question
could withstand judicial scrutiny. The court surveyed existing case law,
bifurcating the cases into those in which such clauses were ruled invalid
(e.g., Ward and Harwood) and those in which such clauses were ruled valid
(e.g., Christiansen and McCord) and the rationale behind each of these
decisions.204 The Tax Court paid special attention to the Petter decision,
which it said drew an important distinction between an impermissible
savings clause, "because it creates a donor that tries to 'to take back
"because it merely
property,"'205 and a permissible the formula clause
20 6
transfers a 'fixed set of rights with uncertain value."'
After surveying existing case law, the Tax Court held that the taxpayers
had used a permissible formula clause rather than an impermissible taxsavings clause.20 7 It pointed out that the taxpayers in Wandry had always
intended to transfer assets the value of which exactly equaled the amount of
their annual exclusions and lifetime exemption amounts. 20 8 In seeking to
fulfill their intentions, there was one unknown: the fair market value of the
limited liability interests. 20 9 And, although the fair market value of this asset
was impossible to know with certainty, the critical factor was "that [its
actual] value was a constant." 210 That being the case, after the IRS audit
was complete and although there was a percentage adjustment, the
taxpayers had not received any property back; instead, the taxpayers and
donees would now have in their possession, related back to the moment the
gift was made, exactly the percentage interest each was supposed to have.2 11
In the final section of the opinion, the Tax Court addressed the IRS's
public policy concerns. The Tax Court first made the general observation
that invoking public policy doctrine to void a tax-savings clause should be a
remedy used only sparingly and only when there may be a "severe and
immediate" public policy concern.2 12 Viewed from this vantage point, the
Tax Court then dismissed the IRS's public policy concerns because, in the
court's words, "the donees and petitioners have competing interests" that
each would seek to protect.2 13 Furthermore, unlike the seminal Proctercase,

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Wandry, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1476.
Id.
Id. at 1477.
Id.
Id. at 1478.
See id. at 1477.
Id. at 1478.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Comm'r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966)).
Id.
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which raised issues related to moot decisions and declaratory judgments,
the court's holding in Wandry would engender a readjustment of
partnership interest holdings and, as such, would supposedly "have
significant Federal tax consequences."214
B. Critiqueof the Wandry Decision
For the past several years, the strategic use of valuation techniques has
played a pivotal role in the estate planning process as taxpayers routinely
use such procedures to minimize their transfer tax exposure.215 Wandry
affords taxpayers new and unprecedented opportunities to capitalize on
these techniques. The question, however, is whether the Tax Court decided
Wandry correctly. In the subsections below, we critique the three central
arguments presented in Wandry that led the Tax Court to rule in the
taxpayers' favor, namely, (1) that donors and donees have "competing
interests"; (2) that partnership capital accounts are of secondary importance,
and (3) that public policy concerns are not "severe and immediate."216
1. Argument No. 1: Donors and Donees Have "Competing Interests"
At first glance, the statement that the donors and donees have
competing interests has superficial appeal. The division of money
supposedly motivates people to protect their personal financial interests;
among family members, theoretically, no exception applies. Upon closer
inspection, however, courts routinely acknowledge that family situations
are different and require special scrutiny and attention. 2 17 The rationale is

214. Id.
215. See Brant J. Hellwig, Revisiting Byrum, 23 VA. TAx REv. 275, 278-79 (2003)
("With courts frequently sustaining combined minority-interest and marketability discounts
in the range of 30-50% from proportionate value, the use of limited partnerships for estateplanning purposes is widely regarded as undermining the integrity of the estate tax."
(footnotes omitted)). See generally Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and Family Limited
Partnerships:A CaseStudy, 39 INsT. ON EST. PLAN. 500 (Tina Portuondo ed., 2005); Brant
J. Hellwig, On DiscountedPartnershipInterests and Adequate Consideration,28 VA. TAX
REv. 531 (2009); Louis A. Mezzullo, Valuation of Corporate Stock, 831-3d TAx MGM'T
PORTFOLIO Worksheet 1 (2007).
216. Wandry, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1478.
217. See, e.g., Dorzback v. Collison, 195 F.2d 69, 71 (3d Cir. 1952) ("We have not
overlooked the principle that transactions between husband and wife calculated to reallocate
family income or reduce family taxes are subject to careful scrutiny."); Cuyuna Realty Co. v.
United States, 382 F.2d 298, 300-01 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("Claim to a debt relationship in a
parent-subsidiary transaction merits particular scrutiny because the control element suggests
the opportunity to contrive a fictional debt, an opportunity less present in an arms-length
transaction between strangers."); United Builders Supply Inc. v. United States, 41
A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 654, 659 (S.D. Miss. 1978) ("In cases of close relationship between the
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simple: there is a vast opportunity for collusion within the family. In other
words, family members ordinarily do not conduct arms-length transactions
as disinterested third parties.
Consider the circumstances described in the Wandry decision. The
taxpayers (a mother and father) transfer membership interests in a limited
liability company to their descendants (their children and grandchildren).2 18
From the descendants' perspective, this transfer constitutes an act of
extraordinary generosity; from the taxpayers' perspective, the fact that they
are shedding over a million dollars of their net worth signifies that they
probably have significant assets in reserve. In light of these circumstances,
there is every reason to assume that the taxpayers and their descendants will
act as one, working together to achieve their mutually beneficial transfer
tax-minimization goals.
Indeed, there are few plausible scenarios in which taxpayers and their
descendants would manifest competing interests. The one unlikely scenario
would be if the taxpayers and their descendants were to have a complete
falling out while a state's statute of limitations was still open. Were this to
occur, the taxpayers might invoke the gift assignment language that
specified a dollar amount being transferred and assert that they had
mistakenly undervalued the limited liability company interests they had
gifted and that, accordingly, a portion of such interests should be
reallocated to them. Even were this to happen, on the basis of several
different legal theories (e.g., detrimental reliance and the doctrine of
laches), the taxpayers' descendants might still be able to defeat the
taxpayers' recoupment threat.
However, taxpayers and their descendants are far more likely to act
collusively. Indeed, the taxpayers and their descendants would probably
have discussed their common goals, including the advantages that would
inure to each if the limited liability company interests were portrayed as
having a diminished fair market value. By adopting this united front (i.e.,
acceptance of the diminished limited liability company value as the
reportable value for gift tax purposes), the taxpayers and their descendants

lessor and the lessee, . . . the Courts have always ruled that close scrutiny of the situation is
appropriate in determining whether some part of the amounts designated as rentals and taken
as a business expense deduction for income tax purposes were in fact disguised distribution
of profits or dividends."); Diesel Country Truck Stop, Inc. v. Comm'r, 2000 T.C.M. (RIA)
1759, 1774 (1990) ("[T]ransactions between related parties are subject to close scrutiny.");
Maxwell v. Comm'r, 95 T.C. 107, 117 (1990) ("In determining whether the form of a
transaction between closely related parties has substance, we should compare their actions
with what would have occurred if the transaction had occurred between parties who were
dealing at arm's length."); Hatt v. Comm'r, 38 T.C.M. (P-H) 1293, 1304 (1969), aff'd per
curiam, 457 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1972) ("The facts that Hatt was the president and majority
stockholder of Johann necessitate careful scrutiny of the [employment] arrangement.
218. Wandry, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1473.
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create a "win-win" situation for the family unit: the taxpayers minimize
their transfer tax burden, and their descendants are able to accumulate more
wealth. The only party that is left out of the financial picture is the
government.
2. Argument No. 2: Partnership Capital Accounts Are Not Controlling
One of the essential elements of partnership taxation is proper capital
account maintenance (capital accounts delineate each partner's economic
stake in the business enterprise).219 Promulgated Treasury regulations
addressing capital account maintenance extend over four single-spaced
pages220 and determine whether a partnership allocation has substantial
economic effect-a critical element under the Code with respect to a
partnership's special allocations of income and losses.22' In the words of
many commentators, proper capital account maintenance is the lifeblood of
partnership taxation. 222
In ordinary circumstances, when one taxpayer gifts a partnership
interest to another taxpayer, the donor partner's capital account declines
and the donee partner's capital account increases accordingly. 2 23 The facts
in Wandry do not constitute an exception to this general rule. For over eight
years following the date when the taxpayers' gifts were made, the limited
liability company presumably conducted business, divided profits and
losses, and made governance decisions based upon the taxpayers' and their
descendants' putative capital accounts and ownership interests.224 There
was nothing in the record before the court to indicate otherwise.22 5
Notwithstanding the critical role that capital accounts typically play in
partnership taxation, the Wandry court relegated their importance in
determining actual property ownership. It declared that "[t]he facts and
circumstances determine [the limited liability company's] capital accounts,
not the other way around." 2 26 The court then pointed out that the governing
"facts and circumstances" at issue were the taxpayers' intentions to cap the

219. See, e.g., Howard Abrams, Taxation of CarriedInterests: The Reform that Did Not
Happen, 40 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 197, 201 (2009) ("Capital account maintenance is specified in
detailed treasury regulations intended to ensure that each partner's capital account reflects
the partner's economic share in the partnership.").
220. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv) (2012).
221. I.R.C. § 704(b) (2006).
222. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. LYONS & JAMES R. REPETTI, PARTNERSHIP INCOME
TAXATION 46 (2011) ("In many cases, the key to determining a partner's rights to the money
and property of a partnership is the partner's capital account.").
223. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(I) (2012).
224. Wandry v. Comm'r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1472 (2012).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1476.
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amount that they gifted to their descendants to specific dollar amounts. 227
While the taxpayers had mistakenly undervalued the limited liability
company interests that they had gifted, the court ruled this to be
immaterial.228 The court even acknowledged the importance of state law in
determining property ownership, citing the elements of a completed gift
under Colorado law.2 29 The court noted that these elements appeared to be
met by the taxpayers on the date of the initial transfer.230 Notwithstanding
the application of state law, the court asserted that book entries cannot
control "when other more persuasive evidence points to the contrary"231 and
closed its discussion on this issue by pointing out that even if the limited
liability company's books were controlling, the actual records of the limited
liability company were "undated and handwritten."23 2 In the court's own
words, "[t]he capital account ledger is unofficial and unreliable."23 3
There are three flaws in the court's capital account analysis.
First, state law controls issues pertaining to property ownership, and
Colorado law would have declared the gift complete on the day it was
made. This should have ended the percentage interest debate. Consider
what would have happened if one or two years after the gift were made, one
of the taxpayers' children had creditor issues. There is little doubt that the
creditor would have been able to attach the debtor child's 2.39 percent
limited liability company interest. In attempting to be shielded from
creditor attacks, the debtor child would have been at a loss to argue that no
attachment could occur until the IRS had conducted an audit and/or a court
had determined actual ownership interests.
Second, the Wandry court placed undue emphasis on the fact that the
IRS is at liberty to recast taxpayers' capital accounts. This ability to recast
capital accounts, the court said, makes capital accounts by their nature
"'tentative' until final adjudication or the passing of the appropriate period
of limitations."234 But Congress has vested the IRS, under certain
circumstances (e.g., the failure by taxpayers to properly account for gains
and losses), with the authority to recast capital accounts. 2 35 The converse is
not true: taxpayers are not at liberty to readjust their capital accounts willynilly based upon a subsequent court decision several years after a transfer

227. Id. at 1475.
228. Id. at 1476.
229. Id. at 1475 (citing United States v. Nat'1 Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 722
(1985); United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 197 (1971)).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1476.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv) (2012).
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has been made.23 6 It is a fundamental precept of tax law that taxpayers
generally must abide by their self-described classifications and
categorizations; the IRS, however, is under no similar compulsion.2 37 This
does not make capital accounts tentative; to the contrary, they are fixed
unless and until the IRS challenges their authenticity (and, in Wandry, the
IRS made no such challenge).23 8
Finally, taxpayers should not be afforded the benefit of doubt when
they exhibit poor record keeping. The fact that the taxpayers in Wandry had
not properly maintained their capital account ledger should not serve as an
excuse for them to argue that the stated percentage interests had not
technically vested with the donees. Indeed, when in doubt, taxpayers' poor
record keeping practices have routinely cast a dark shadow against a
239
taxpayer's position.
3. Argument No. 3: Public Policy Concerns Are Not
"Severe and Immediate"
In Procter,there was grave concern that a taxpayer's strategic use of a
condition subsequent could fundamentally undermine the integrity of the
transfer tax system. 2 40 The IRS echoed this concern, issuing a revenue
ruling that directly attacked tax-savings clauses containing a condition
subsequent.241

236. See, e.g., Orrisch v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 395, 401 (1970), aff'd per curiam in
unpublished opinion, (9th Cir. 1973) (taxpayers who ignore their capital accounts do so at
the risk that the IRS need not respect their allocations).
237. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 584 (1978) ("[T]he Government
should honor the allocation of rights and duties effectuated by the parties" when "there is a
genuine multiple-party transaction with economic substance ... compelled or encouraged by
business or regulatory realities, . . . imbued with tax-independent considerations, and . .. not
shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached. Expressed
another way, . . . the form of the transaction adopted by the parties governs for tax
purposes."); Comm'r v. Nat'1 Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134 (1974)
("[W]hile a taxpayer is free to organize his affairs as he chooses, nevertheless, once having
done so, he must accept the tax consequences of his choice whether contemplated or not, and
may not enjoy the benefit of some other route he might have chosen to follow but did not.");
accordGray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 414 (1941) ("The choice of disregarding a deliberately
chosen arrangement for conducting business affairs does not lie with the creator of the
plan.").
238. Wandry v. Comm'r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1472 (2013).
239. See, e.g., Harker v. Comm'r, 1994 T.C.M. (RIA) 3152, 3162 ("Contentions by
taxpayers who try to benefit from the fact that they kept poor records are subject to particular
scrutiny.").
240. Comm'r v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824, 827 (4th Cir. 1944).
241. See e.g., Rev. Rul. 86-41, 1986-1 C.B. 300 (IRS refused to permit two different
valuation-adjustment clauses that pertained to putative real estate transfers. The first clause
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Despite the judiciary's and IRS's attacks on tax-savings clauses that
contain a condition subsequent, neither has ever elaborated upon the nature
of conditions subsequent and how they differ from conditions precedent.
Consider the Black's Law Dictionary definition of the phrase condition
subsequent: "A condition that, if it occurs, will bring something else to an
end; an event the existence of which, by agreement of the parties,
discharges a duty of performance that has arisen." 242 A simple example
illustrates a condition subsequent. Suppose a taxpayer transfers fee simple
title to rent-producing property known as Blackacre to her daughter.
Suppose further that the gift assignment stipulates that if the IRS or a court
finally determines that the fair market value of such transfer exceeds the
taxpayer's unused gift tax exemption amount (say, $5 million), the excess
value, if any, must be returned to the taxpayer. If this condition subsequent
were upheld (namely, there were a valuation redetermination by the IRS or
a court and a transfer back of the excess portion to the taxpayer), it would
function to insulate the Blackacre transfer and similarly structured
arrangements from transfer tax.
Despite the judiciary's and IRS's expressed disdain toward tax-savings
clauses that contain a condition subsequent, there has been tacit approval (at
least on the judiciary's part) of tax-savings clauses that contain a so-called
condition precedent. Black's Law Dictionary defines the phrase condition
precedent as follows: "An act or event, other than a lapse of time, that must
exist or occur before a duty to perform something promised arises."243 Once
again, the prior example can help illustrate a condition precedent. Suppose
a taxpayer transfers $5 million to her daughter, and in the gift assignment
declares that the gift will be funded with title to Blackacre equal to such
value, allocable upon a final determination of its fair market value by a
court of law or the IRS. The condition precedent to the gift being
effectuated (namely, a court of law or the IRS making a valuation
determination) is a necessary condition to specify with certitude the exact
amount of real estate being transferred and that portion being retained. If
this condition precedent were upheld (i.e., if there were a valuation
redetermination by the IRS or a court and a reallocation of the excess
portion to the taxpayer), it would likewise function to insulate the Blackacre
transfer and similarly structured arrangements from transfer tax.

instructed that the taxpayer would transfer back to the taxpayer that portion of the real estate
necessary to make the value of the gift $1,000, and the second clause required that the
transferee pay to the transferor cash equal to the value of the property in excess of $1,000.
The IRS premised its position on the fact that each transfer was subject to a condition
subsequent.).
242. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 334 (9th ed. 2009).
243. Id.
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Distinguishing between a condition subsequent and a condition
precedent has historically proven to be a nettlesome exercise244 and, in the
area of contracts, completely abandoned.24 5 Indeed, with the substitution of
a few words, a condition subsequent can be transformed into a condition
precedent and vice versa. This identification process has proven elusive; on
numerous occasions, courts have been beset with confusion.24 6 Therefore,
having valuation determinations and judicial outcomes turn upon the
existence of a condition precedent versus a condition subsequent is a
touchstone that lacks merit. Proof of this is evident in the fact that
conditions precedent and conditions subsequent almost always produce the
same outcome in the tax context: taxpayers are shielded from tax, and the
IRS's audit efforts are for naught.

244.

See, e.g., OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 316-17 (1881)

(noting the

confusion underlying the distinction between "conditions precedent" and "conditions
subsequent" and describing the manner in which all conditions may be seen both as
precedent and subsequent); CLAUDE ROHWER & GORDON D. SCHABER, CONTRACTS IN A

NUTSHELL 313 (4th ed. 1997) ("Before one gets too confused by the precedent and
subsequent classifications, it might be helpful to know that in contract law there is no
substantive difference between the two."); BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING

250 (3d ed. 1923) ("What are generally called conditions subsequent in contracts are so
called with little propriety. They are in substance conditions precedent to the vesting of
liability and are subsequent only in form." (quoting Professor Williston)); William V.
Dorsanco III & C. Paul Rodgers III, The Flawed Nexus Between Contract Law and Rules of
Procedure: Why Rules 8 and 9 Must Be Changed, 31 REV. LITIG. 233, 262 (2012) ("Rule
9(c) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] is flawed because it preserves the traditional
but troublesome distinction between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent-a
distinction rejected by the Second Restatement of Contracts."); Bryan Porter, Bad Faith and
Attorney Approval Clauses: Breach or Moot Point?, 34 J. LEGAL PROF. 399, 401 (2010)
("The distinction between a condition subsequent and a condition precedent can be one of
semantics in many instances. . . .").
245.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§

224(e) (1981). The distinction

between conditions subsequent and conditions precedent may be losing its significance in
the area of future interests as well. See Benjamin D. Barros, Toward a Model Law of Estates
and Future Interests, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2009) (discussing an emerging view that
would significantly undercut the importance of the distinction); see also Koontz v. St. Johns
River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.Ct. 2586, 2589-90 (2013) (discussing the distinction and
refusing to give it significance in the context of constitutional-condition jurisprudence).
246. See, e.g., Twin Fires Inv., LLC v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., Civ. A. 0000751-F, 2002 WL 31875204, at *24 n.18 (Mass. Super. Dec. 16, 2002) aff'd, 445 Mass.
411, 837 N.E.2d 1121 (2005) ("This Court recognizes, as has the Appeals Court, that the
distinction between a condition precedent and a condition subsequent is often hard to
understand and 'the source of considerable confusion."' (citation omitted)); Flynn v. Hanna,
131 P.3d 844, 849 n.7 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) ("This case illustrates the confusion generated by
relying too heavily on labels such as 'condition precedent' or 'condition subsequent."');
Wash. Props., Inc. v. Chin, Inc., 760 A.2d 546, 549 n.3 (D.C. 2000) (noting that use of terms
condition precedent and condition subsequent is confusing).
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Consider the examples posited in this subsection pertaining to the title
transfer of Blackacre. If the IRS and courts ultimately agree that its fee
simple value is $7.5 million, regardless of whether a condition subsequent
or a condition precedent governs, the outcome to the taxpayer is the same:
she becomes a one-third tenant in common with her daughter.247 Another
way of saying the same thing but in more familiar terms is that when it
comes to substance versus form debates, the former always takes
precedence in tax law,24 8 and by having courts focus almost exclusively
upon parsing between whether particular verbiage gives rise to a condition
precedent or a condition subsequent clouds issues of much greater
significance (such as what the taxpayers' actual property interests were
under state law).
Admittedly, there may be minor differences between a taxpayer using a
condition subsequent versus a condition precedent, but the practical effects
are likely to prove inconsequential. For illustration purposes, assume that
the Blackacre transfer previously described above was made on January 1,
2014, and that seven years later on December 31, 2020, following an IRS
audit and judicial controversy, a court of law affixes a $7.5 million fair
market value related to such real estate.
For illustration purposes, we first assume that a condition subsequent is
operative. On January 1, 2014, the Blackacre transfer is supposedly
complete; if and when the condition subsequent is met, on December 31,
2020, a portion of that transfer is then undone. During the seven year
interval between January 1, 2014, and December 31, 2020, the donee is
treated as the property's owner and will enjoy and bear all of the
concomitant income and deductions associated with such property
ownership.
By way of contrast, we next assume that a condition precedent is
operative. Until December 31, 2020, when the fair market value of
Blackacre becomes fixed, the transaction is supposedly not complete
(notwithstanding the fact that all of the underlying title paperwork and
income tax returns by the taxpayer and her daughter will indicate that the
transaction was complete on January 1, 2014). Upon learning of her
valuation error, the taxpayer donor and the donee will both supposedly have
to file amended income tax returns for 2014 through 2020. (These are the
tax years in which the donee fallaciously reported the income and
deductions related to Blackacre on her income tax returns when such
income and deductions should have instead been reported on the donor's

247. By pure happenstance, the taxpayer in the first scenario incurs transfer tax, while
the taxpayer in the second scenario would not.
248. Under this doctrine, a taxpayer cannot, as a general matter, alter the tax
consequences of a transaction by manipulating its form; however, the IRS is free to maintain
the form chosen by the taxpayer. See generally William S. Blatt, Lost on a One-Way Street:
The Taxpayer's Inability to Disavow Form, 70 OR. L. REV. 381 (1991).
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income tax returns.) In many instances, however, the filing of amended
income tax returns will either be null and void because the majority of tax
years in question will be closed due to the general three-year statute of
limitations;249 or, alternatively, because of the donor's strategic use of
grantor trusts,250 the need to file amended returns will be obviated.
To summarize, when the practical effects of the Wandry decision are
distilled down to their essentials, there is no escaping the reality that the
decision is largely what it contends it is not, namely, a declaratory judgment
(i.e., deciding property rights between various taxpayers). Furthermore,
granting free rein to taxpayers' use of tax-savings clauses likely constitutes
a more immediate and severe threat to the government's coffers than the
Wandry court acknowledges.
IV. PROPOSED REFORMS

Taxpayers routinely use tax-savings clauses in a variety of contexts. 2 5 1
The reason for this practice is evident: taxpayers want an insurance policy
of sorts to shield themselves from additional tax, interest, and penalties. The
IRS's concerns, however, are obvious: the unchecked use of tax-savings
clauses could wreak havoc to the integrity of the tax system because
taxpayers feel immunized when taking highly aggressive tax positions.
Thus, the question becomes whether the courts and the Treasury
Department can strike the appropriate balance between these competing
interests.
Two considerations frame the way in which a balance between
taxpayers' and the IRS's competing agendas may be struck. The first
consideration is that the IRS can invoke the public policy doctrine, although
the acknowledged viability of this doctrine turns upon whether there is a
serious threat to the administration of the tax system.252 The second

249. I.R.C. § 6501(a) (2006).
250. See generally Jay A. Soled & Mitchell Gans, Sales to Grantor Trusts: A Case
Study of What the IRS and Congress Can Do to Curb Aggressive Transfer Tax Techniques,
78 TENN. L. REv. 973 (2011).
251. See, e.g., C. Strobel & G. Strobel II, Savings Clauses Can Protect Against
Revalued Transfers in Family Transactions, 14 TAX'N FOR LAW. 22 (1985).
252. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. In seeking to invalidate tax-savings
clauses, the IRS has invoked the public policy doctrine in litigation on several occasions. To
date, this approach has proved to be lackluster. See supra Section II.B.2. This is not a
surprising outcome given the Supreme Court's rejection of the IRS's expansive use of the
public policy doctrine in other contexts. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Even
more important, perhaps, is the agency's seemingly inconsistent stances that: (1) tax-savings
clauses are so offensive to the operation of the tax system that even without any textual basis
in the Code, they must be invalidated; and (2) the agency has respected clauses that serve
somewhat similar functions in other contexts. See supranote 2.
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consideration is that Congress has granted the IRS the authority to craft
regulations that preserve the Code's integrity, 253 and, as long as such
regulations are consistent with the Code's statutory language and are
neither arbitrary nor capricious, courts will uphold them.254 Together, these
two considerations suggest that if a particular kind of tax-savings clause
poses a serious public policy risk, the IRS should invoke the public policy
doctrine and defeat clauses of this nature. Alternatively, if the kind of taxsavings clause in question does not pose a serious public policy risk but it
nonetheless enables taxpayers to defeat their tax obligations (i.e., there is a
legitimate policy concern), the IRS should craft regulations that curb the
use of such clauses.
In the sections that follow, we explore how (A) the courts should refine
the public policy criteria upon which the sanctity of tax-savings clauses
should be evaluated; and (B) the IRS should strategically address legitimate
policy concerns through administrative channels and, in particular, the
crafting of Treasury regulations.
A. Refining Public Policy CriteriaUsed to Evaluate Tax-Savings Clauses
In its analysis of the tax-savings clauses, the Proctercourt declared that
tax-savings clauses should not be upheld if they would be detrimental from
a public policy perspective.25 5 The Procter court focused upon three
concerns, i.e., whether such clauses would (1) undermine IRS enforcement
efforts; (2) cause courts to render moot decisions; and/or (3) trigger the
issuance of declaratory judgments.2 56 In this section, we examine these
criteria and suggest two possible additional criteria.
To assist our examination, consider two opposite fact patterns, one
involving what would undoubtedly be an impermissible tax-savings clause
and another involving what would undoubtedly be a permissible taxsavings clause. Regarding the first fact pattern (impermissible tax-savings
clause), suppose the sole owner of a corporation devises an employment
agreement specifying that the owner/employee will receive $10,000
annually for business-related expenses, but if the IRS conducts an audit and
determines that the putative business expenses are truly personal in nature,

253. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006).
254. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704,
710-15 (2011) (acknowledging that tax regulations are entitled to Chevron deference,
similar to any other agency, regardless of their source of authority (i.e., unless "arbitrary or
capricious," they should be upheld as valid)). See generally Daniel W. Graves, Not So
Special After All: How Mayo Granted the Treasury Unfettered Rule-Making Discretion, 77
Mo. L. REv. 283, 284 (2012) ("[T]he Court has given the Treasury Department virtually free
rein in crafting new regulations and amending those regulations already in existence.").
255. See supranotes 21-33 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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then such expenses will be treated as deductible salary payments (rather
than nondeductible constructive dividend payments). Regarding the second
fact pattern (permissible tax-savings clause), suppose a taxpayer dies and
her last will and testament contains the following clause:
I bequeath an amount equal to my unused federal estate tax exemption
amount to the named trustees of a bypass trust to be held pursuant to its
terms and conditions; and the balance of my estate, if any, shall pass to the
named trustees of a marital trust to be held pursuant to its terms and
conditions.
While both of these clauses are designed to minimize each taxpayer's
tax burden, under the scrutiny of the public policy doctrine-which
essentially declares that tax-savings clauses that jeopardize the
administration of the nation's tax system are void-the first tax-savings
clause would not pass muster whereas the second clause would. This is
because the first clause's sole purpose is tax motivated to shield the
corporate taxpayer from IRS audit risk; in contrast, the second clause's
foremost purpose is to direct appropriate trust funding.
From these two antithetical fact patterns, we examine the public policy
25 7
doctrine and the criteria as set forth in Procter.
We also develop two
additional criteria that future courts might consider useful in evaluating
whether a particular tax-savings clause should be upheld.
The Procter public policy criteria have withstood the tests of time and
good reason because they are logical and designed for sound administration
of the nation's tax system. Consider the first criterion, i.e., whether such
clauses would undermine IRS enforcement efforts.258 If the taxpayer was
able to negate such a proposed assessment vis-A-vis a tax-savings clause
every time the IRS conducted an audit, then additional tax, interest, and
penalties might never apply, which would eliminate the efficacies of such
audits and thereby significantly erode tax compliance. Consider the second
criterion, i.e., whether such clauses would cause courts to render moot
decisions. 259 If the effect of a tax-savings clause is that a court's decision
would be rendered moot, the clause would diminish judicial deference and
constitute an unjustifiable waste of judicial resources. Finally, consider the
third criterion, i.e., whether such clauses would trigger the issuance of
declaratory judgments. 26 0 By way of background, a declaratory judgment is
one where there are no factual disputes and the only relief sought is a
declaration of the status or rights of the plaintiff under law. 2 6 1 In an effort to

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Comm'r v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944).
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
See supranote 24 and accompanying text.
See supranote 25 and accompanying text.
See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 918 (9th ed. 2009) ("A binding adjudication that

692

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:655

curb the unnecessary use of limited judicial resources, federal courts are
statutorily prohibited from issuing declaratory judgments in tax matters 262
except in limited circumstances.263 Consistent with this prohibition,
taxpayers should not be able to secure the equivalent of a declaratory
judgment through the backdoor channel of using a tax-savings clause.
In determining the merits of a tax-savings clause beyond those public
policy criteria enumerated in Procter, the judiciary should consider
applying two additional criteria. First, grafted onto the public policy
doctrine should be the notion that factual outcomes should not hinge upon
whether the IRS conducts an audit and/or a court of law reaches a particular
conclusion. The reason for this prohibition is obvious: it fosters
arbitrariness in outcomes. More specifically, if the IRS conducts an audit or
a court reaches a decision, a tax-savings clause putatively produces one
factual outcome. Conversely, if no audit is conducted or court decision is
reached, a tax-savings clause produces a different factual outcome. Such
outcomes, however, should not turn upon whether an audit is conducted or
judicial decision is rendered. Put differently, facts are not fluid, turning on
extraneous events, and should be treated as such. 26
In the evaluative process, there is one more public policy criterion that
courts should consider enlisting. Tax-savings clauses should be more
readily upheld in areas of legal rather than factual uncertainty. Taxpayers
will commonly resort to tax-savings clause use because facts are unknown
or an area of law is unsettled. Courts should examine this pretext for taxsavings clause usage. If facts are uncertain and this uncertainty arises, in
part, due to the taxpayers' actions (e.g., taxpayers establish a closely held
business enterprise to diminish the size of their taxable estates and thus
cloud the value of their otherwise easy-to-value marketable securities), then
tax-savings clause usage should be met with grave skepticism. Conversely,
if an area of the law is uncertain and a taxpayer uses a tax-savings clause
due to this legal uncertainty (e.g., whether a particular piece of property
qualifies for the estate tax marital deduction), courts should give taxpayers
the benefit of the doubt. Generally, taxpayers can control factual
happenings, but control and mastery of the law are typically beyond them.
Noticeably absent in the existing and suggested public policy criteria
set forth above is reliance upon so-called conditions precedent and
conditions subsequent. This absence is for good reason: taxpayers may too
easily manipulate such conditions - a manipulation that cannot be respected

establishes the rights and other legal relations of the parties without providing for or ordering
enforcement.").
262. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (2010).
263. I.R.C. § 7428 (2006).
264. See Comm'r v. Nat'l Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 148
(1974) ("[There is an] established tax principle that a transaction is to be given its tax effect
in accord with what actually occurred and not in accord with what might have occurred.").
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for tax purposes without undermining the important tax principle of
substance over form. Accordingly, reliance upon them would fail to achieve
the objective of protecting the public, including fellow taxpayers, the IRS,
and the courts. As a way of determining the strengths or shortcomings of
tax-savings clauses, Congress, the Treasury Department, and the IRS
should therefore eschew criteria tied to such conditions, particularly when
there are more informative criteria readily at hand.
B. StrategicallyAddressing Policy Concerns
Through Administrative Channels
Admittedly, the vast majority of tax-savings clauses do not threaten the
administration of the tax system and, therefore, courts will not consider
them void under the public policy doctrine. 26 5 Such tax-savings clauses
generally fall within the scope of two categories. The first category includes
those clauses that the IRS acknowledges have merit and that the agency
accordingly sanctions.266 The second category includes those clauses that,
although not sufficiently pernicious as to violate the public policy doctrine,
function nevertheless as devices designed to thwart taxpayers' legitimate
tax obligations.267 It is this latter category that is the subject of this
subsection.
As has been previously pointed out,2 68 taxpayers have historically
sought ways to minimize their risks of bearing additional tax, and taxsavings clauses can play a critical role in fulfilling this goal. However, there
are some circumstances in which the Treasury Department should draw the
line and declare that taxpayers-not the government-should bear the tax
risks associated with particular transfers and transactions. It is in these
circumstances that the Treasury Department should craft regulations that
reassign the risk of additional taxation, interest, and penalties to taxpayers.
Using one example from the transfer tax area (valuation-adjustment
clauses) and another example from the income tax area (those clauses
designed to preserve grantor trust status), we demonstrate this point in the
subsections below.
1. Valuation-Adjustment Clauses That Seek to Eliminate Valuation Risk
The Code seeks to balance the advantages and disadvantages associated
with making inter vivos gifts compared with making testamentary bequests.
On one side of the ledger sheet, gifting offers a threefold advantage. First,
from the moment the gift is made, any appreciation in the value of the

265.
266.
267.
268.

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
See supra note 2.
See supra note 2.
See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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gifted roperty and the income therefrom are removed from the transfer tax
base.2 Second, within limits ($14,000 in 2013), a gift can qualify for the
so-called "annual exclusion" that enables taxpayers to transfer relatively
large sums on a tax-free basis. 2 7 0 Third, while the gift tax is computed on a
tax-exclusive basis, the estate tax is computed on a tax-inclusive basis.27 1
On the other side of the ledger sheet, however, there are three distinct
disadvantages associated with gift giving. First, to the extent that a transfer
triggers a gift tax liability, the taxpayer is required to make an immediate
payment and thereby forfeit the opportunity to use this money for incomeproducing purposes. Second, for income tax purposes the donee generally
takes the donor's tax basis in a gifted asset272 rather than a tax basis in the
asset equal to its fair market value-the applicable rule had the asset been
held until the taxpayer's death. 273 Third, in the case of hard-to-value assets
(e.g., interests in a closely held business enterprise), a donor reporting such
value incurs valuation risk and the possibility of bearing tax, interest, and
penalties. 274

269.

Samuel A. Donaldson, Income Taxation of Outright Gifts, Nongrantor Trusts,

Estates and Beneficiaries, in ESTATE PLANNING IN DEPTH 65, 67 (2007) (an asset that

balloons in value after the transfer occurs can save significant federal estate taxes); Mitchell
M. Gans, GRITs, GRATs and GRUTs: Planning and Policy, 11 VA. TAX REv. 761, 813
(1992) (indicating that all income and appreciation accruing after a gift is made is excluded
from the donor's tax base); John A. Miller & Jeffrey A. Maine, The Fundamentalsof Wealth
Transfer Tax Planning:2011 and Beyond, 47 IDAHo L. REv. 385, 430 (2011) (post-transfer
appreciation excluded from tax base).
270. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2006). Under this provision, taxpayers may give up to $14,000
per year to as many donees as they choose without any incurring any gift tax liability. Id.
And, for estate tax purposes, once assets are gifted, they are not included in a decedent's
gross estate. See Rev. Proc. 12-41, 2012-45 I.R.B. 539 (determining the amount of the
exclusion, based on an inflation index, to be equal to $14,000 in 2013).
271. See Theodore S. Simms, Timing Under a Unified Wealth Transfer Tax, 51 U. CHI.
L. REv. 34, 35-39 (1984) (explaining and critiquing how funds used to pay the gift tax are
generally removed from the transfer tax base, whereas funds used to pay the estate tax
remain subject to transfer tax).
272. I.R.C. § 1015(a) (2006).
273. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (2006).
274. As a practical matter, taxpayers often choose to gift hard-to-value assets in order to
achieve valuation discounts. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. One might question
why taxpayers who gift hard-to-value assets must be required to confront this risk while
taxpayers who gift easy-to-value assets need not. The answer is that in many hard-to-value
cases, the valuation difficulty is self-imposed. In other words, taxpayers often establish
entities (such as limited partnerships and limited liability companies) funded with easy-tovalue assets (such as marketable securities) as a means to transfer those assets at deeply
discounted values. See, e.g., Howard M. Esterces, Make Best Tax Use of FLPs and LLCs in
Estate Planning,73 PRAc. TAX STRATEGIES 260 (Nov. 2004) (advocating the use of family
limited partnerships and limited liability companies to diminish the value of a taxpayer's
easy-to-value assets). In these instances, from a policy perspective, it makes a lot of sense to
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The delicate balance described above can readily unravel if taxpayers
perceive that there are opportunities to make significant lifetime gifts of
hard-to-value assets without any valuation risk and the concomitant
possibility of additional tax, interest, and/or penalties. As valuationadjustment clauses eliminate valuation risk, they tip the scales heavily in
favor of gifting. From a general tax policy perspective, the resulting
damage to the transfer tax system is severe. It provides taxpayers with a
powerful incentive to form closely held business ventures such as a family
limited partnership, contribute their easy-to-value assets (e.g., marketable
securities) to these newly formed entities, and then gift interests in these
entities to their loved ones. 275 Due to minority and marketability valuation
discounts associated with the transfer of closely held business interests,276
the promotion of this sort of gift giving significantly jeopardizes the
transfer tax base.
To date, courts have not been receptive to the IRS position that all
value-adjustment clauses necessarily violate the public policy doctrine.27 7
To the contrary, as discussed, taxpayers using a defined-value clause have
been successful in sheltering their transfers from risks of revaluation.27 8
However, the IRS is not without recourse. Consistent with the Ninth

require such taxpayers to assume valuation risk.
275. See Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, The Estate Tax Non-Gap: Why Repeal a
"Voluntary" Tax?, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 153, 159-60 (2009); Wendy C. Gerzog,
Valuation Discounting Techniques: Terms Gone Awry, 61 TAx L. 775, 789-91 (2008)
(reaching the same conclusion). See also George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New
Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 161, 195-204
(1977). See generally James R. Repetti, Minority Discounts: The Alchemy in Estate and Gift
Taxation, 50 TAx L. REv. 415 (1995); Walter D. Schwidetzky, Last-Gasp Estate Planning:
The FormationofFamily Limited Liability Entities Shortly Before Death, 21 VA. TAX REv. 1
(2001).
276. See Schwidetzky, supra note 275, at 11-12 (indicating that minority discounts
reflect a lack of control inherent in the transferred interest, and marketability discounts
reflect an "inability. . . to readily dispose of the interest . . . .").
277. In each of the cases in which taxpayers prevailed, either the IRS did not advance
the public policy argument or, alternatively, the courts dismissed it. See supra Section II.B.2.
278. In Ward, the taxpayer used such a valuation-adjustment clause based on a
condition subsequent, requiring the donee to return the portion of the gifted asset determined
to exceed the stipulated value. Ward v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 78, 116 (1986). In determining the
amount of the gift, the court disregarded the clause. Id. In the more recent cases, taxpayers
used a defined-value clause, the same clause that the taxpayer used in Ward but drafted
instead as a condition precedent, gifting to the donee only that portion of the asset
determined to equal the value stipulated in the transfer document. As previously discussed,
the courts have found this difference in drafting to be decisive. See supra Section III.B. As a
result, taxpayers in the more recent cases have succeeded in altering the advantagedisadvantage balance. See supra Section III.B.
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Circuit's recommendation in the Petter decision, 279 to prevent taxpayers
from eliminating valuation risk and from thereby altering the delicate
balance between gifting and bequeathing assets, the IRS should use the
authority granted to it under Code Section 7805 to promulgate regulations
that eliminate this practice.
In the preamble to the proposed regulations, the IRS could explicate the
balance the Code attempts to strike between lifetime and testamentary
transfers. It could then explain that if the balance between lifetime gifts and
testamentary transfers is to be maintained, taxpayers should not be
permitted to use value-adjustment clauses to negate valuation risk. In
recognition that valuation-adjustment clauses open the door for taxpayers to
distort the reported value of the assets reported for gift tax purposes, the
regulations should be added to existing regulations promulgated under
Code Section 2512, which defines the term "value" for purposes of
applying the gift tax. This would overrule the spate of recent cases in which
the taxpayer prevailed, 28 0 thus making it clear that valuation-adjustment
clauses (of whatever variety) are invalid.281 Under such regulations, a

279. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713
(2011) (quoting United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 838 (2001));
Petter v. Comm'r, 653 F.3d 1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[W]e expressly invite[] the
Treasury Department to 'amend its regulations' if troubled by the consequences of our
resolution of th[is] case.").
280. See supra Section II.B.2.
281. In theory, as the IRS did in Rev. Rul. 86-41, 1986-1 C.B. 300, the proposed
Treasury regulation could make reference to Procterand seek to codify the public policy
doctrine. If the IRS adopted this approach, however, it would need to explain that, as a
matter of substance, there is no difference between a valuation-adjustment clause that uses a
condition subsequent and one that uses a condition precedent. In other words, the difference
between these two variations is merely one of form. Again, the regulation would overrule the
recent defined-value cases, but based on the public policy doctrine rather than the need to
maintain the advantage/disadvantage balance. Treasury regulations crafted in this fashion,
however, could prove to be more vulnerable to a challenge in court. For, as the Wandry court
pointed out, the Supreme Court has taken a narrow view of the scope of the public policy
doctrine as a general matter in tax cases. See Wandry v. Comm'r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1472,
1478 (2012) (citing Comm'r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 694 (1966)). Thus, a taxpayer
challenging Treasury regulations predicated on the public policy doctrine might well
convince a court to invalidate such regulations despite the extensive deference that these
regulations ordinarily enjoy. See Mayo Found, 131 S. Ct. at 713 (adopting Chevron in the
tax context and explaining its deferential approach). Moreover, as taxpayers have previously
argued, the IRS's willingness to accept some tax-savings clauses, see supra note 2, and
reject others, see supra note 3, might undermine the claim that such clauses are so
problematic that they need to be struck down even though there is no textual basis for doing
so in the Code. See Petter, 96 T.C.M. (RIA) at 280 (reviewing the inconsistencies in the
IRS's position). Although, ordinarily, an agency's record of inconsistency on an issue does
not necessarily invalidate a regulation, see, e.g., Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541
U.S. 739 (2004), it might have this unintended consequence were the IRS to invoke the
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taxpayer who gifts a hard-to-value asset would not be able to eliminate
valuation risk. More specifically, the regulations could provide as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in Treasury Regulations 1.664, 25.2518 and
25.2702, a formula clause that values an asset dependent upon a
determination made by the IRS or a court of law shall be void, whether the
clause uses a condition-subsequent approach, a condition-precedent
approach (such as a defined-value clause), or any other approach and
whether or not the clause is based upon the finally determined gift tax
value. 282
Using three examples, the IRS should illustrate the application of the
foregoing rule. Each example should be based on the following fact pattern:
Suppose a father owns all one thousand shares of Company X, a closely
held business. Suppose further that (i) the overall business of Company X is
worth $1 million; and (ii) the father wishes to make a gift of Company X
shares to his son worth $50,000.
The first example should be based on the Ward decision.283 Suppose the
father determines the value of Company X shares to be $500 per share 28 4
and, using a condition-subsequent tax-savings clause, accordingly gives one
hundred shares of Company X stock to his son. Under the clause, if the fair
market value of the gifted shares is finally determined to be more or less

public policy doctrine.
282. In McCord, the tax-savings clause in question did not use the phrase "as finally
determined for gift tax purposes." McCord v. Comm'r, 461 F.3d 614, 627 (5th Cir. 2006).
As a result, the majority in the Tax Court did not believe that it was necessary to consider
the IRS's public policy argument. Id. Instead, the majority concluded that the tax-savings
clause did not have the desired effect of eliminating the IRS's proposed deficiency. Id. at
631. Put differently, if the number of shares or units passing to the noncharitable donee were
not made dependent on the value as found by the court, it would be possible that the units
passing to the noncharitable donee would have a greater value than the amount stipulated in
the clause, thus producing a gift tax deficiency. In reversing the Tax Court, the Fifth Circuit
was aware that the failure to use the "finally determined" phrase could have this effect, but
construed the tax-savings clause to read as if the taxpayer had actually used the phrase. As a
result, the Fifth Circuit was able to hold that the clause eliminated the deficiency. Id. at 627.
In future cases, on the one hand, it is possible that taxpayers will include the
"finally determined" phrase in order to ensure that their tax-savings clauses have the effect
of eliminating potential deficiencies; on the other hand, it is also possible that taxpayers will
avoid using the phrase, as in McCord, in the hope that they will be able to avoid triggering
application of the public policy doctrine. Accordingly, we propose that the Treasury
regulations make clear that the use of such phraseology will be denied effect for tax
purposes regardless of how it is drafted.
283. See supra note 278.
284. The father might use a minority and marketability discount of 50 percent, see
Cooper, supra note 275, and the resulting share price would thus be $500 ((1,000,000 1,000) x .5).
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than $500 per share, an adjustment would occur. To illustrate, if the gift tax
value were finally determined to be $1,000 per share, under the Ward
clause, the son would be required to return half of the gifted shares to the
father so that the total amount of the taxable gift would remain equal to
$50,000. The example should conclude, as did the court in Ward, that such
a condition-subsequent tax-savings clause is invalid and that the taxable gift
is equal to the value of the one hundred shares, or $100,000 ($1,000 x 100).
In the second example, the regulations should hypothesize a Wandrytype defined-value clause.285 The clause should be the same as in the first
example except that it should be drafted as a defined-value clause rather
than as a condition-subsequent clause (as used in Ward). Thus, the clause
would provide that the father transfers such number of all of his shares as is
equal to $50,000 in value. As in the first example, the clause should be
disregarded, and the father should be treated as having made a gift of
$100,000 (i.e., the fair market value of the one hundred shares that he
transferred). Although, at first blush, this result might seem harsh given that
the father never intended to gift more than $50,000 in value, there is no
principled basis upon which to distinguish the second example from the
first. Indeed, to do so would be to elevate form over substance and to
thereby permit taxpayers to escape the new regulation through the simple
expedient of modifying the way in which they construct the clause. Just as
it is necessary to eliminate condition-subsequent valuation-adjustment
clauses in order to prevent taxpayers from defeating valuation risk, the
same rationale applies to the use of the condition-precedent (defined-value)
clauses.
Following the Petter fact pattern,2 86 the third example should address
valuation-adjustment clauses that use charitable organizations (and/or
marital transfers) as a means to insulate transfers from transfer tax. The
clause could, for instance, provide that the father makes a gift of one
hundred shares of Company X stock to his son but that if the value of such
shares exceeds $50,000, the excess is to pass to an entity that qualifies for
the gift tax charitable deduction. 2 87 The example should conclude that if the
value of the gifted shares in the closely held business interest proves to be
higher, say $100,000, this amount would constitute the amount of the
taxable gift. In justifying this outcome, the Treasury regulation should
explain that valuation-adjustment clauses need to be ignored
notwithstanding the fact that a charitable organization is a donee. The
rationale for this conclusion is that while the Code does contemplate that
charitable organizations will be subsidized,28 8 it does not reveal an intention

285. See supra Section III.
286. See supra Section II.A.2.d.
287. I.R.C. § 2522(a) (2006).
288. See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable Tax
Subsidies, 91 B.U. L. REv. 601, 606-09 (2011) (discussing how a charitable tax exemption
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to permit taxpayers to leverage the use of charitable organizations in order
to eliminate valuation risk.
The proposed Treasury regulations set forth above should mention two
additional items. First, the proposed regulations would have to make clear
that while valuation-adjustment clauses would be deemed void, the IRS
would continue to respect other kinds of formula clauses for enumerated
policy reasons. Such formula clauses would continue to enable taxpayers to
determine the amount of a decedent's marital bequest,2 89 the funding of
charitable trusts, 29 0 the funding of grantor-retained annuity trusts, 2 9 1 and the
determination of a disclaimed amount.292 Second, the IRS should explicitly

affects a subsidy); Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charitiesa Subsidy?, 64
TAX. L. REv. 283, 283-87 (2011) (explaining how exemptions for charity create a subsidy).
289. Estate planners commonly use formula clauses in order to bifurcate estates of
married decedents into tax-free (marital) and non-tax-free (nonmarital) shares. See Rev.
Proc. 64-19, 1964-1 C.B. 682. In the past, the IRS has sanctioned the use of such clauses and
should continue to do so because these clauses are utilized in the testamentary setting and
present no risk of upsetting the delicate balance between inter vivos and testamentary
transfers.
290. The existing rigor of the rules set forth under Code § 664 esigned to make sure
that charity receives economic benefits commensurate with the amount of the charitable
deduction taken by the taxpayer-makes it appropriate to permit taxpayers who make gifts
in compliance with the section to avoid valuation risk. See I.R.C. § 664 (2006).
291. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(b)(1)(ii)(B) (2005). The legislative history underlying
Code § 2702 indicates that the section was patterned after Code § 664, which authorizes the
use of valuation-adjustment clauses. See 136 CONG. REc. 30538 (Oct. 18, 1990) ("Therefore,
the committee determines that the valuation problems inherent in trusts and term interests in
property are best addressed by valuing retained interests at zero unless they take an easily
valued form-as an annuity or unitrust interest. By doing so, the bill draws upon present law
rules valuing split interests in property for purposes of the charitable deduction."). In the
future, in reconsidering formula clauses generally, the IRS may choose to revisit this
regulation since taxpayers currently use it to eliminate their gift tax exposure. But see I.R.S.
Tech. Adv. Mem. 02-45-053 (Nov. 8, 2002) (indicating that the regulations under I.R.C.
§ 2702 do not contemplate that taxpayers may negate their gift tax liability). Revising the
regulations to invalidate valuation-adjustment clauses for purposes of I.R.C. § 2702 would
not necessarily be inconsistent with the legislative history of I.R.C. § 2702 because Congress
presumably did not intend to incorporate into I.R.C. § 2702 every aspect of the then-existing
regulations under 1.R.C. § 664.
292. The vast majority of disclaimer use is associated with testamentary dispositions.
That being the case, the policy concern articulated in the regulation's preamble (namely, the
balance between inter vivos and testamentary transfers) would have little or no application in
this context. It may, however, be appropriate for the IRS to consider modifying the
disclaimer regulations to prohibit the use of valuation-adjustment clauses in the inter vivos
context. To illustrate, assume that a father wants to make a $5 million gift to his son but
wants to avoid valuation risk. If the regulation we suggested is adopted, the father might
make the gift and have the son disclaim any amount determined to have a value in excess of
$5 million. To make certain that our suggested regulation is not gamed via the disclaimer
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explain that the rationale of these proposed Treasury regulations does not
rest on public policy grounds; instead, the proposed Treasury regulations
rest upon the clear policy objectives inherent in Code Section 2512, namely
the accurate reporting of asset values and the need to maintain the delicate
balance between the advantages and disadvantages associated with lifetime
gift giving.
2. Tax-Savings Clauses Designed to Preserve Grantor Trust Status
In drafting trust instruments, taxpayers commonly use grantor trust
status-a status which generally enables the grantor taxpayer rather than the
trust itself to be the responsible taxpayer-to achieve several tax-saving
objectives.2 93 If a later audit reveals that the trust in question is not entitled
to this tax-favored status, the advantages associated with this status will of
course be unavailable. To protect against this risk, taxpayers often insert
tax-savings clauses designed to provide that the terms of the trust are to be
construed in a manner designed to ensure grantor trust status. 2 94
Tax-savings clauses designed to safeguard grantor trust status,
however, contravene the statutory and regulatory scheme of Subpart E of
Subject J of the Code (defining grantor trust status). The legislative history
of this subpart makes clear that the only way a trust may be characterized as
a grantor trust is if it has one of several enumerated features delineated in
Code Sections 673-79.295 Many courts have explicitly stated that this
legislative history precludes the IRS from arguing that the taxpayer in
question had sufficient indicia of control to render the trust grantor in
nature; instead, the courts have declared that, in this realm of the law,
Congress has issued specific criteria that make a trust grantor in nature and

regulations, we would suggest an amendment to the disclaimer regulation that would deny
effect to such a disclaimer clause.
293. I.R.C. §§ 671-79. See, e.g., Stephen R. Akers, Jonathan G. Blattmachr & F.
Ladson Boyle, Creating Intentional Grantor Trusts, 44 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 207
(2009) (explaining the tax-saving advantages associated with the use of grantor trust status).
294. Sample trust language might read as follows: "Subject to the foregoing, it is also
the Settlor's intent that this trust be treated as a 'grantor trust' under §§ 671 et seq. of the
Code during the Settlor's lifetime and that solely for federal and state income tax purposes,
the Settlor be deemed the owner of the entire trust corpus and income at all times while the
Settlor is living." Note that, in Rev. Proc. 07-45, 2007-2 C.B. 89, the IRS approved the use
of a clause in a trust instrument that negated any powers or interests that would cause the
trust to qualify as a grantor trust.
295. See H. REP. No. 83-1337, pt. 2, at 4351-52 (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017 ("It is also provided in this section [671] that no items of a trust shall be
included in computing the income or credits of the grantor (or another person) solely on the
grounds of his dominion and control over the trust under the provisions of section 61
(corresponding to sec. 22(a) of existing law). The effect of this provision is to insure that
taxability of Clifford type trusts shall be governed solely by this subpart.").
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that failure to meet these specific criteria renders the trust nongrantor in
nature. 296
In light of this legislative history and case law, the IRS would therefore
be at liberty from a policy perspective to preclude taxpayers from using taxsavings clauses designed to transform otherwise nongrantor trusts into
grantor trusts. Otherwise, if and when the IRS audits a trust to challenge its
grantor trust status, the grantor could simply argue that under the terms of
the tax-savings clause the grantor had an offending power (such as a power
of substitution) 297 that ensured grantor trust status. To the extent that a
sound policy rationale argues against a taxpayer's ability in the face of an
IRS audit to alter tax outcomes in a unilateral fashion, tax-savings clauses
of this nature should be deemed void.
Thus, akin to value-adjustment clauses, the IRS should consider using
its regulatory authority to prevent taxpayers from relying on tax-savings
clauses designed to ensure grantor trust status.29 8 In the regulations
themselves, the IRS could spell out that trust terms are to be strictly
construed and that tax-savings clauses will not enable taxpayers to read in
provisions into the trust instrument that are simply not present or to utilize
liberal construction rules for tax-favored interpretive purposes. The effect

296. See, e.g., Estate of Goodwyn v. Comm'r, 35 T.C.M. 1026, 1040 (1976) ("Section
671 precludes attributing the income to Goodwyn on any other theory of dominion and
control under the definition of gross income, including the Clifford doctrine. We interpret
this limitation to mean that if Goodwyn cannot be considered as a trustee, in fact, under the
statutory provisions of subpart E, he cannot be considered as such by virtue of the judicial
doctrines arising from the Clifford case which Congress intended to limit through the
enactment of subpart E.").
297. I.R.C. § 674(b)(4) (2006).
298. Consistent with current practice, the Treasury regulation might permit the use of a
tax-savings clause where the instrument creates more than one trust and the clause simply
makes clear that the problematic power does not apply in the case of one of the trusts. See
Rev. Rul. 75-440, 1975-2 C.B. 372. In the ruling, the decedent's will had created two trusts,
a trust that was designed to qualify for the estate tax marital deduction and a residuary trust
that would not so qualify. Id. Under the will, the trustee was given a power that, if applicable
to the marital trust, would render the marital trust ineligible for the estate tax marital
deduction. Id. However, the will also contained a tax-savings clause, denying effect to any
clause in the will that would render the estate tax marital deduction unavailable. Id. The IRS
concluded that the estate tax marital deduction was valid by reason of the tax-savings clause.
Id. In doing so, it distinguished the situation where, as in Rev. Rul. 65-144, 1965-1 C.B. 422,
the instrument contains only one trust and a tax-savings clause is used to render inoperative
any provision that is found problematic by the IRS or the courts. Rev. Rul. 75-440, 1975-2
C.B. 372. Parenthetically, the IRS has not consistently followed the distinction between an
instrument that contains a single trust and one that contains multiple trusts. In Rev. Proc.
2007-45, 2007-2 C.B. 89, for example, the IRS approved the use of a clause negating any
power that might produce a tax outcome contrary to the taxpayer's objective even where the
instrument contained only one trust.
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of such Treasury regulations would be that all taxpayers, whether they are
subject to audit or not, would be required to abide by the same rules; no
clause that is dependent on whether the taxpayer is audited should be given
effect. Equity requires this kind of broad sweep. While the IRS has not
previously articulated such an expansive approach, it has previously
expressed its hostility to the "audit lottery" by making it impermissible for
tax advisers to incorporate such considerations into the advice they give
taxpayers. 2 99 Treasury regulations crafted to eliminate tax-savings clauses
as they pertain to grantor trust status would represent an extension of this
philosophy.
In a world in which all tax returns were audited, the presence of taxsavings clauses would not likely present a risk to the government that
taxpayers would shortchange their tax obligations. However, in the real
world, in which most tax returns are not audited, 3 0 0 tax-savings clauses
often enable taxpayers to take calculated risks which come at the
government's expense. It is in this latter world-the one in which we
exist-that the judiciary and the IRS must be proactive.30
When attempting to differentiate between permissible and
impermissible tax-savings clauses, the vast majority of taxpayers
admittedly do not seek to stake out aggressive tax positions. Instead, they
want to be compliant and are simply in need of guidance. In responding to
this call for guidance, the Treasury Department should promulgate
regulations (such as those recommended above) that are within the
authority of Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v.

299. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CIRCULAR 230, § 10.34; see also Treas. Reg. §
1.6694-2(b) (2012). There would thus appear no impediment to using a similar approach that
is aimed not merely at the tax adviser but rather directly at the taxpayer.
300. See, e.g., Treasury Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., Trends In Compliance
Activities Through Fiscal Year 2010, at 38 app. IV, fig.33 (July 18, 2011) (Ref. No. 201130-071), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2011reports/201130071fr
.pdf(showing that of the 142,823,000 income tax returns filed for fiscal year 2010, only
1,581,000 were examined).
301. Consider the fact that judicial doctrines are shrouded in mystery regarding their
application. This is by design: the fact that taxpayers do not know the exact line between
what is permissible and what is not creates a chilling effect upon those taxpayers who wish
to take aggressive tax positions. See 1 BORIS BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS T 4.3.1, at 4-27 (3d ed. 1999) (claiming that the
vagueness of rules are their strength because "when the meaning of a provision is veiled by
fog, taxpayers may tread more warily than when the landmarks are clearly visible"). Such
judicial gloss produces an immediate benefit: Congress does not have to craft legislation on
a case-by-case basis that addresses each and every existing and anticipated tax stratagem.
The elimination of pernicious tax-savings clauses would have an effect similar to that of
judicial doctrines, namely, making taxpayers more cautious in the tax return positions they
adopt.
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United StateS30 2 and that accurately draw the appropriate line between those
tax-savings clauses that are permissible and those that are not.
V. CONCLUSION

Tax-savings clauses are not going to go away anytime soon. Indeed,
until the courts clarify the application of the public policy doctrine and the
Treasury Department takes a more active stance in promulgating
regulations that restrict their use, taxpayers will continue to test the waters,
and we suspect that tax-savings clauses will become even more ubiquitous.
Among other things, this analysis makes clear that attempting to
distinguish between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent and
using one or the other to uphold or to nullify tax-savings clauses is a poor
solution. Instead, there are other, more informative criteria that directly
address public policy concerns and are far less susceptible to taxpayer
manipulation. In addition, the Treasury Department is empowered to
promulgate regulations that eliminate those tax-savings clauses that lack
justification from a tax administration point of view. Action to clarify the
differences between permissible and impermissible tax-savings clauses
should be taken sooner rather than later.
If the judiciary refines the public policy doctrine and the Treasury
Department adopts a more proactive approach toward crafting regulations,
tax-savings clause use would be more measured. Taxpayers would continue
to use tax-savings clauses to alleviate issues of uncertainty, but such clauses
could no longer be used as devices to shield taxpayers from IRS audit risks
and protect them from shouldering their legitimate tax burdens. Needless to
say, this would be a good thing for the administration of the tax system as a
whole.
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